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ABSTRACT
Citizens are born, but they are also made. How its citizens come to
be—whether the educations they receive will expand or constrain their
future options, whether the values they assimilate will encourage or
dissuade their civic engagement, etc.—fundamentally concerns the
state. Through the power it wields over a vast range of policymaking
contexts, the state can significantly influence (or designate those who
will influence) many of the formative experiences of young citizens.
Young citizens’ accumulated experiences in turn can significantly
influence the future mature citizens they will become. The state
insufficiently considers the cumulative nature of its citizens’
development, however. Discrete spheres of policy- or law-making may be
internally consistent, but they lack consistency when combined over time
and across a range of contexts—which is the way in which developing
citizens experience them. As a result of this discontinuity, the state at
best squanders opportunities to more effectively advance its ends with
respect to immature citizens; and at worst, fails to meet its most basic
obligations to them.
This Article develops a framework to guide the decisions that affect
the young across a range of law and policy contexts, providing
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consistency and a coherence that will better serve those citizens and
further the state’s ends. It grounds the framework in the core values and
ends of the liberal democratic state, which dictate the state’s most basic
obligations to its citizens, and its requirements of them. It accounts for
the interests and constitutional rights of both parents and children. To
better understand how these might change as the young develop to
maturity, it reviews the processes of cognitive development, drawing on
research from a range of disciplines within developmental science. This
review examines developing capacities, ongoing deficiencies, and the
effects of external influences on development. It then integrates these
theoretical, constitutional, political, and developmental considerations
into a framework comprising the ends toward which decisions affecting
the young should aim: (1) guaranteeing parents’ liberty to form and
raise a family; (2) denying anyone absolute authority over the
immature, while transferring to the immature themselves authority in
realms where they have reliably attained decision-making maturity; (3)
ensuring that young citizens will attain maturity with their
entitlement to life-deciding liberty intact; and (4) ensuring that young
citizens will attain maturity having acquired the capacities to fulfill
the basic obligations of citizenship.
To begin illustrating the framework’s potential effects, the Article
proposes a set of policies consistent with it. For infancy and early
childhood, it proposes minimizing interference in parenting. For
adolescence, it endorses obligatory, out-of-home education. It more
generally proposes that decision makers identify contexts in which young
citizens can make competent self-regarding decisions. The Article
argues that by mid-adolescence, these include making health care
decisions and voting. It also argues for changes to policies in other
contexts where young citizens’ decision making is likely to remain
compromised, even into young adulthood, including driving and
combat.
Because the scope of policymaking affecting the young is so vast,
future projects will carry forward and expand upon the policymaking
implications of the framework set out here.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The liberal democratic state is its citizens. And citizens are born,
but they are also made. How its citizens come to be—whether the
educations they receive will expand or constrain their future options,
whether the values they assimilate will encourage or dissuade their
civic engagement, etc.—fundamentally concerns the state. Through
the power it wields over a vast range of policymaking contexts, the
state can significantly influence (or designate those who will
influence) many of the formative experiences of young citizens.
Young citizens’ accumulated experiences in turn can significantly
influence the future mature citizens they will become. The state
insufficiently considers the cumulative nature of its citizens’
development, however. Discrete spheres of policy- or law-making
may be internally consistent, but they lack consistency when
combined over time and across a range of contexts—which is the
way in which developing citizens experience them. As a result of this
discontinuity, the state at best squanders opportunities to more
effectively advance its ends with respect to immature citizens; and at
worst, fails to meet its most basic obligations to them.
Consider one example: Parents of children enrolled in a public
elementary school want them excused from reading a textbook that
promotes values contrary to their religious beliefs. The state board of
education refuses to accommodate them, since the readings do not
compel the children to act or profess any belief. The parents then
remove their children from the school system altogether, opting to
continue their education in a more cloistered environment of
dubious academic rigor. Assume the school’s refusal was lawful, as
the Sixth Circuit in Mozert v. Hawkins in fact held such a refusal to
be.1 The decision whether to accommodate the children therefore
rested within the state’s policymaking discretion. Despite its being
lawful and justifiable on administrative efficiency and other grounds,
however, did the state’s decision further its ultimate ends with
respect to its developing citizens? Did it even consider these? What
would an approach that considers and accounts for such ends look
like?

1. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). See also discussion infra Part V.D.1.
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State actors regularly confront questions, across a wide range of
law and policy contexts, whose resolution can profoundly affect the
young, both during their immaturity and beyond: Should parents be
permitted to provide the entirety of a child’s education within their
home? Should public schools accommodate the children of parents
like those in Mozert, who object to their children learning tolerance,
respect for difference, and critical thinking? Should fifteen-year-olds
make their own health care decisions? Should sixteen-year-olds drive
motor vehicles unfettered? Or at all? Should the military have the
power to send seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds into combat
zones?2
The goal of this Article is to develop means of guiding the
myriad state decisions affecting immature citizens so that together,
these decisions cohere into a consistent and effective set of policies.
In pursuit of this goal, I identify and argue for a set of ends toward
which decisions affecting the young should aim.
To identify these ends, I examine political theories of the state,
citizenship, and civic education; interpret constitutional doctrine that
shapes parents’ and children’s rights; evaluate individual interests and
significant political considerations; and, to gain a better
understanding of the ways in which interests and rights may change
as the young develop to maturity, survey research in cognitive
development, including developmental cognitive and social
neurosciences. I then consider the implications of all these and
integrate them into a simple four-part framework. Its core comprises
the core values of the state itself, but out of that abstract core
emerges a structure sufficiently concrete to provide practical
guidance to state actors. The framework also provides a normative
measure against which state actors might assess the separate and
combined effectiveness of their policies or decisions.
To start with as universal a premise as possible, I begin by
assuming only the existence of the state and its current structure as a
liberal constitutional democracy.3 Drawing on its founding principles
2. See infra Part V.C–D.
3. To be clear, “liberal” here refers not to the progressive ideology of the left-leaning
faction of the Democratic Party. It instead refers more broadly, and loosely, to the political
philosophy that served as the country’s founding principle and thus includes the core political
commitments of most of its citizens—“that all men are created equal,” that among their
inalienable rights is the right to “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” and that
governments are instituted “to secure these rights, . . . deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The
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and the work of classical through contemporary political liberal
theorists, it is no great leap to derive the core value of the state—
individual liberty. To be more precise, its core value is negative
liberty, a conception of freedom as noninterference.4 It is another
modest step to derive from its core value the primary, most basic end
of the state—safeguarding citizens’ liberty. And since the young are
both current and future citizens, the state must guard not only their
current liberty, but also their future liberty. It thus must deny all
others, including parents, the right to deprive the young either of
their basic liberty during their immaturity, or their ability to develop
the capacity to exercise their future liberty.5
Safeguarding their current and future liberty is thus the state’s
most basic end with respect to its young citizens. But this is abstract
and does not explicitly account for the interests of both parents and
children. So I refine the state’s ends in these ways: Because of the
importance of their role as children’s default caregivers, because they
value childrearing to such an extent that many consider that activity
part of their own identities, and because they also are citizens whose
liberty the state seeks to ensure, the state should consider and try to
accommodate parents’ interests while working toward its youngcitizen-respecting ends.6 It should do likewise with respect to the
interests of its young citizens—those related to their welfare (their
well-being irrespective of their choices) as well as their autonomy
(their interests in exercising those liberties of which they are
capable).7
The welfare and autonomy interests of young citizens both
change dramatically as they mature. Their immediate and long-term
welfare will depend in large part on external influences—education,
environment, and experience. State decision making should take
account of these influences on the young, since developmental
research confirms that they can enrich or constrain development.
State decisions should also take account of the autonomy interests of
the young, a task complicated by the ambiguity inherent in assessing
decision-making capacity. Insights from the science of development
Constitution’s Preamble announces the document’s purpose to include “secur[ing] the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” U.S. CONST. pmbl.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.A–B.
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can inform these efforts as well. Research across disciplines describes
a predictable developmental trajectory and explains many of the ageand context-specific aspects of young persons’ decision-making
competence (and decision-making deficiencies). Understanding the
basic trajectory of development therefore becomes critical.
I derive from these refinements a more specific set of ends to
guide decision making affecting the young. These are: (1)
guaranteeing parents’ liberty to form and raise a family; (2) denying
anyone absolute authority over the immature, while transferring to
the immature themselves authority in realms where they have reliably
attained decision-making maturity; (3) ensuring that young citizens
will attain maturity with their entitlement to life-deciding liberty
intact; and (4) ensuring that young citizens will attain maturity
having acquired the capacities to fulfill the basic obligations of
citizenship.8
Having proposed the set of ends toward which decision making
affecting the young should aim, I then begin considering
implications of this approach—what sorts of decisions might the
framework support? I commend one possible set of policies. Putting
them forward as a set renders transparent the tradeoffs made among
the sometimes-competing priorities of the framework.
During infancy and early childhood, the state should interfere
only minimally in parenting. This furthers parents’ liberty interests,
allowing them to pass their values on to their children. It also aims
to further young citizens’ welfare interests by improving parents’
commitment to childrearing. The state should nonetheless step up
efforts to increase parents’ awareness of the importance of enriching
young children’s early experience, in light of the overwhelming
evidence of its positive effects on development. The sorts of
experiences that enhance children’s development (talking, reading,
singing to them, etc.) are well within the abilities of, and unlikely to
be resisted by, most parents; the state’s efforts on this front should
thus stop short of imposing mandatory obligations on them.9
Parental deference does not, on its own, maximize children’s
liberty. But as part of a coherent set of policies, it does. Early
parental deference would give way to reduced parental authority in
adolescence. Beginning in early adolescence (which developmental

8. See infra Part V.B.
9. See infra Part V.C.
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scientists increasingly recognize as a second critical period of brain
and cognitive development), the state would take more affirmative
measures to ensure young citizens’ future liberty and capacity to
fulfill the obligations of citizenship.10
Chief among these more affirmative measures would be
obligatory, out-of-home secondary education. Adolescents’
education would include certain minimum substantive content, with
attendance mandatory until late adolescence (age eighteen, perhaps).
This policy would help ensure that young citizens will reach maturity
having gained the capacities to exercise their basic, life-deciding
liberty and to perform the functions required of the citizenry.
Denying parents the ability to educate their adolescent children
entirely within the home guarantees that all citizens will be exposed
to the life choices available to them and be reasonably able to pursue
them. Parents would retain the ability to enroll children in privatelyrun schools. Though some private schools might present concerns
similar to those presented by homeschooling, the state is better able
to monitor these than it is to monitor in-home education. Parents
would retain the ability to homeschool children prior to secondary
school, and of course, nothing would prevent their otherwise
continuing to educate and influence their children.11
This prescription in important respects runs counter to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which requires
states to respect parents’ religiously grounded objections to their
adolescent children’s continued formal education.12 I join others
who have urged that, despite the bedrock nature of religious rights
in this country, Yoder should be reconsidered. There are at least two
justifications for this position: First, no one, not even a parent,
should receive state-sanctioned power to unduly constrain or
foreordain another’s future; giving parents the right to dominate
their children’s education or deny them formal schooling altogether
(which is, of course, in addition to the significant influence already
wielded by parents over their children) does just that. Second, the
argument that children will be confused or unduly influenced by

10. See infra Part V.D.
11. See id.
12. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment requires that states
exempt from school attendance requirements adolescent children whose parents’ objections to
their continued formal education is grounded in religious belief). See discussion infra Part
V.D.1.
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exposure to values inconsistent with those held by their families of
origin may hold true for younger children, but not for adolescents.
Instead, by mid-adolescence, individuals have reached adult-like
information-processing and logical reasoning abilities (other abilities
continue to mature into adolescence). They thus have the same
(imperfect) cognitive abilities as their parents to distinguish their
“public”
education
from
their
home
education
and
compartmentalize the two if/when they conflict.13
Finally and more broadly, I urge state decision makers to identify
to the extent possible those contexts where young citizens will have
reliably attained competent decision-making capacities, and others
where their decision making is most likely to be compromised. The
state should aim to afford them decision-making authority with
respect to the former, and constrain their authority with respect to
the latter. This approach safeguards young citizens’ liberty, both
current and future. Respecting their autonomy expands their current
liberty; protecting them from their deficiencies promotes their
current welfare and also preserves their future liberty.
The state should, however, proceed with caution. Insights from
developmental science can inform these decisions, but science cannot
prescribe policy. State actors may take account of development and
the specific autonomy interests of the young, but their decisions
must also consider and take account of the full range of interests
affected, including the potential negative externalities of adolescents’
bad choices in a given context.14
Keeping that caution in mind, the state should endeavor to allow
young citizens to exercise the liberties of which they are capable,
especially in purely self-regarding contexts. In other words, in those
contexts where they have achieved decision-making competence,
they should correspondingly have decisional autonomy. With respect
to those specific liberties, the young are mature; the justifications for
denying them those liberties or permitting others to make decisions
on their behalf thus disappear.
In what contexts, and by what age, can it be safely said that
adolescents
have
achieved
decision-making
competence?
Developmental scientists have concluded that by mid-adolescence
(around ages fifteen or sixteen), basic cognitive and information-

13. See infra Part V.D.1.
14. See infra Part V.D.2.
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processing abilities are mature. So long as they can make a
considered decision, outside the presence and influence of peers,
adolescents have the capacity for mature decision making. I suggest
two contexts that meet these criteria and in which adolescents should
receive decisional autonomy—health-care decision making and the
franchise.15
Conversely, even after adolescents have attained the cognitive
capacities needed to make rational, considered decisions, real-world
stressors can confound their capacities and impede their decision
making. For example, the quality of their decision making suffers in
situations that require adolescents to quickly assess and react to risk,
to reason while highly stressed or in the heat of passion, to make
decisions in unfamiliar circumstances, or to act in the presence of
peers. The neurobiological processes that support mature decision
making under these conditions do not fully mature until late
adolescence or early adulthood. In addition, risk-taking and
sensation-seeking behaviors peak in early- to mid-adolescence (ages
fourteen to sixteen or so), then decline. Researchers are also
beginning to understand the neurobiological bases of these
behaviors. That adolescents’ decision-making deficiencies and riskand sensation-seeking behaviors have neurobiological underpinnings
helps explain why educational interventions, which provide
information about the risks that attend certain behaviors, have had
little success in changing adolescent behavior.16
In light of their cognitive deficiencies, I propose that states more
assertively constrain adolescents’ liberties in contexts that
compromise their decision-making abilities, particularly where their
bad decisions might have serious negative externalities. Driving is
one example. Driving requires near-instant risk assessment and quick
decisions—factors that hinder adolescent decision making.
Adolescents’ proclivity for risk-taking compounds their decisionmaking deficiencies. Indeed, traffic fatalities are the leading cause of
death among adolescents, and their crash rates are higher than those
of any other group. These rates worsen, moreover, in the presence of
peers. States should thus consider imposing additional restrictions on
adolescent driving. Many states have begun doing so. Despite efforts
to improve their driving skills and increasing adoption of graduated

15. See infra Part V.D.3.
16. See infra Part IV.C.2–3.
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licensing programs, evidence suggests that only age, not education
or even practice, correlates with reductions in crashes and fatalities.17
Examples of other contexts that may compromise adolescents’
and emerging adults’ decision making including alcohol
consumption and certain aspects of military service. I thus briefly
discuss possible approaches to curbing alcohol abuse. And finally, I
question the wisdom of sending into combat the youngest adults
who serve in the military. Young soldiers must assess risk in stressful,
unfamiliar circumstances and make split-second decisions; mistakes
are obviously more likely in this context than in others to lead to loss
of life, as well as enduring trauma for the soldier himself.
The Article proceeds as follows:
Part II describes the state’s interests in and roles with respect to
its citizens generally, and its immature citizens in particular. It argues
that the state’s most basic end is citizens’ liberty, and its secondary
end is its citizenry’s performance of those functions necessary for the
state’s continued existence. It then extends the application of these
ends to the young.
Part III describes parents’ interests in and constitutional rights to
childrearing. It notes that although the latter are a highly valued
component of parents’ individual liberties, they receive relatively
weak constitutional protection because of their unique—and
illiberal—status as an entitlement in the life of another.
Part IV describes children’s interests and constitutional rights.
To inform this discussion with a better understanding of the course
of development to adulthood, it surveys recent research in cognitive
development, including developmental cognitive and social
neuroscience. While it is important not to draw conclusions that this
still-emerging research does not support, it is also important for state
actors to understand and, where appropriate, account for the
significant changes wrought by the course of development.
Developmental scientists’ understanding of cognitive development,
its neural underpinnings, and how these relate to children’s and
adolescents’ decision making and behavior may help state actors
develop policies more effective than those to date.
Part V synthesizes from the previous three Parts a framework
comprising the basic ends toward which state action affecting the
young should aim. To illustrate its possibilities, it uses the framework

17. See infra Part V.D.4.
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to make an initial set of policy recommendations, outlined above. I
only begin addressing implications of this proposed approach; it
remains to subsequent projects to develop and build upon the
foundation established here. The range of policymaking decisions
affecting young citizens is vast, and varied. By each looking to a
shared overarching standard, state actors across this vast range help
ensure that the cumulative influence of their decisions on immature
but developing citizens is consistent with and furthers the state’s
ends.
II. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE AND ITS CITIZENS, MATURE
AND IMMATURE
State actors—federal and state courts, legislatures, administrative
agencies, etc.—make countless decisions that influence immature
citizens’ lives. These decisions can be more effective and coherent
when decision makers take to heart the ends toward which they
should aim. This Part identifies the most basic of the state’s ends.
The next two Parts will refine these ends by considering and
accounting for specific interests and rights of parents and the young,
and the final Part synthesizes from the previous three a single
overarching framework to guide state decision making.
Part II.A first identifies the core value of the liberal constitutional
democracy, settling on the value accepted by all liberals—liberty. A
state’s values determine the ends ideally furthered by state decision
making. The minimum ends that derive from the state’s
commitment to liberty are simply these: (1) citizens’ basic liberty and
(2) the collective citizenry’s performance of those functions essential
to the state’s continued existence. The latter ensures the state’s
ability to achieve the former and is thus secondary to it.18
Having thus identified the minimum ends of the state, Part II.B
next explores how the state might pursue its ends with respect to a
particular subset of its citizenry, the immature. It concludes that the
duality inherent in the nature of their citizenship—the immature are
current citizens but also future mature citizens—requires from the
state a similar duality in its approach.19
First, as current citizens, the immature have a claim to liberty,
even during their immaturity. Their claim imposes on the state a
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
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corresponding duty to withhold from all others absolute, unchecked
authority over them. Though other considerations may warrant
delegating significant authority over the immature to parents or
caregivers,20 the state must itself assert some residual authority or
interest—akin to a fiduciary interest—on their behalf until the
immature develop the capacity to exercise authority over
themselves.21
Second, as future mature citizens, the immature have a claim to
their future liberty. Because their period of immaturity is critical to
and in many ways shapes citizens’ future mature lives,22 their claim to
future liberty imposes on the state another duty, fundamentally
different from the first: preserving immature citizens’ future
capacities to exercise their basic liberty. And to achieve its secondary
end, the state should also seek to ensure their future capacities to
perform those functions required of the citizenry. The state must
accordingly also deny others the right to deprive immature citizens
of their abilities to develop these future capacities.23
Some liberals might dispute the designation of liberty as the core
value from which this analysis should proceed. Modern liberal
egalitarians, for example, would counter that liberalism’s core is
more robust than “bare liberty,” and that as a result the liberal state
has broader obligations towards its citizens.24 That may be, but it is
beside the point. Proceeding even from what they might consider a
too-skimpy version of liberalism—and of liberty itself—reveals
plenty. Identifying just the bare minimum ends of the state with
respect to its immature citizens is enough to expose the inadequacies
of the state’s existing policies; these guarantee neither the current
liberty nor the future capacities of immature citizens.25
This Part identifies the bare minimum ends of the state not
simply to provide a measure for assessing existing policies with
respect to its immature citizens, however, these ends can also serve as
fixed points toward which modified policies might coherently aim.
20. This Article will hereafter use the term “parent” to refer to primary caregivers
generally. Many non-biological parents act as primary caregivers and “parent” the children for
whom they care. The term also reflects that the state designates biological parents as the
default caregivers of the children they conceive and bear. See infra Part V.C.
21. See infra Part II.B.1.
22. See infra Part IV.C.
23. See infra Part II.B.2.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
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Policies might also pursue more ambitious or broader goals, but they
should at a minimum further these.
The United States is a liberal constitutional democracy, and all of
this discussion takes the nation’s current political and constitutional
structures as given.26 It is, moreover, a sufficiently stable political
order that to consider things as they might appear in some different
order would be a mere academic exercise, in the pejorative sense.
A. The State’s Core Values and Minimum Ends
The state’s core values should determine its ends, and state actors
should make policies and decisions that advance those ends. This
Part identifies the core value of the liberal constitutional democratic
state as liberty—negative liberty, in particular. From that simple core
emerge two basic ends, or goals: (1) citizens’ liberty, which is the
state’s minimum obligation to its citizens, and (2) its citizenry’s
performance of the functions necessary for its continuance, which is
its minimum requirement of them. The next Part (II.B) then argues
that the state must begin pursuing its basic ends during citizens’
immaturity, else risk failure to achieve its ends generally.27
It will be news to no one that one of the central values of the
liberal state is liberty.28 For many liberals, liberty is the central value
of liberalism. For others, it is part of a more complex and robust
core.
To “classical” liberals, individual liberty is the core value of the
liberal state.29 Associated in the United States with political
conservatives, classical liberals hew more closely to Lockean and
26. Political theorist Stephen Macedo notes that “‘[i]t has long been a truism that the
American political tradition is basically a liberal tradition’ and that this tradition is the ‘basis’ of
th[e] country’s ‘national identity.’” STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 5–6 (1990)
(quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA: THE THANKLESS PERSUASION 67
(1962) and SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 23
(1981)).
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. John Locke, for example, asserted that individuals are naturally in “a State of perfect
Freedom to order their Actions . . . as they think fit.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). Modern
liberal theorists have agreed. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 44
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Some refer to the concept that freedom is normatively basic as the
“Fundamental Liberal Principle.” See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN
ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 162–65 (1996).
29. N. SCOTT ARNOLD, IMPOSING VALUES: AN ESSAY ON LIBERALISM AND
REGULATION 3 (2009).
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libertarian traditions, which decry government intervention in private
ordering.30 They view liberty and private property as closely
intertwined; some argue that private property is essential to the
protection of liberty,31 while others maintain that that property is
itself a form of liberty.32 Political philosopher Friedrich Hayek’s
writings helped spark a late twentieth-century resurgence of classical
liberal ideas in the West,33 where leaders like Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher gave them political voice.34
To “modern” liberals, on the other hand, liberalism’s
foundational commitment is the equal status and treatment of each
person.35 John Rawls, the central figure in modern liberalism,
advanced a theory of justice whose first principle is that “[e]ach
person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
all.”36 Modern liberals thus embrace egalitarianism and support a
more active role for government in securing personal and political
rights.37 The Democratic Party in the United States and the Labor
Party in Great Britain generally seek to advance modern liberal
egalitarian principles,38 and the existing United States regulatory
state tends to reflect them.39
For classical and modern liberals alike, then, individual liberty is a
core value. But it is more than this. It is their least common
denominator—the value which all liberals agree the liberal state must

30. PAUL KELLY, LIBERALISM 69–70 (2005). See generally IAN HARRIS, THE MIND OF
JOHN LOCKE (1994); LOCKE, supra note 28.
31. E.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, Liberalism, in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 149 (1978).
32. E.g., HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994).
33. ARNOLD, supra note 29, at 3–4. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY];
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
34. ARNOLD, supra note 29, at 3–4.
35. KELLY, supra note 30, at 4–7. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE
(2000); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
36. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM].
37. Id. at 135–38.
38. ARNOLD, supra note 29, at 3.
39. Id. at 125–35.
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embrace.40 For this reason, this Article settles on liberty as the state’s
core value.41
Even as they share a commitment to liberty, however, liberals
have different conceptions of it; and each suggests different ends for
state policies to pursue. In order to derive from the state’s
commitment to liberty the ends that policies should pursue, we must
first define the conception of liberty that operates here. Liberal
theorists tend to embrace one of three of these conceptions.42
The first conception of liberty is the one most commonly
associated with liberalism—negative liberty.43 As famously described
by Isaiah Berlin, “[p]olitical liberty in this sense is simply the area
within which a man can act unobstructed by others.”44 Negative
liberty is freedom from external restraint on action or compulsion to
act. It can be boiled down to the idea of freedom as
noninterference.45 Critics of negative liberty argue, however, that it
elides the importance of social and community connections and
shared goals and thus mischaracterizes the individual as an atomistic,
self-centered being.46
The second conception of liberty is positive liberty. Whereas
negative liberty requires freedom from external interference, positive
liberty requires freedom from internal weaknesses that keep one from
acting in accordance with reason or morality.47 Proponents of
positive liberty characterize freedom as autonomy. And autonomy
requires self-mastery, the ability to delay short-term gratification to

40. See, e.g., HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 33, at 257–58.
41. Though liberty is also the central value for classical liberals, this analysis does not
embrace classical over modern liberal ideology; instead it merely attempts to set out from as
universally acceptable a premise as possible.
42. For a more extensive discussion of the competing versions of liberty, see Samantha
Besson & José Luis Martí, Law and Republicanism, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM: NAT’L AND
INT’L PERSP. 3, 14–15 (Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2009).
43. KELLY, supra note 30, at 51.
44. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122
(1969).
45. Id.; KELLY, supra note 30, at 54.
46. Communitarian theorists in particular charge that the liberal preoccupation with the
individual ignores the importance of community and the pursuit of shared values and goals.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 116 (1982). For a
response to communitarian critiques of liberalism, see MACEDO, supra note 26.
47. BERLIN, supra note 45, at 131. See also T.H. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 228 (Paul Harris & John
Morrow eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1895).
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achieve long-term goals, and critical self-reflection.48 Some critics of
positive liberty reject what they see as the perfectionist and
paternalistic implications of this concept of liberty, since it empowers
the state to impose “true” freedom on its citizens.49 Negative liberty
theorists like Berlin counter, moreover, that freedom merely requires
the abilities to reflect and to choose. Thus while autonomy or
enlightenment may be important values, they are values distinct
from—not prerequisites to—liberty.50
The third main conception of liberty is republican liberty.
Republican theorists generally view liberty as the absence of
domination, which they distinguish from the absence of interference
that defines negative liberty.51 Domination requires more than mere
interference; it requires arbitrary interference, or the possibility of
it.52 Whereas negative liberty theorists consider all forms of
interference to be restrictions on personal freedom, republican
theorists argue that certain forms of non-arbitrary interference do
not restrict freedom at all. Thus when the people enact laws in
furtherance of their collective interests, there is no interference with
liberty.53 For republicans, political participation guarantees freedom.
Critics of republican liberty respond that it is more accurate to
acknowledge that state interference does restrict personal liberty, but
that in some cases it does so legitimately—such as when the state
restricts a lesser liberty in order to guarantee a greater liberty.54
Because republican liberty and negative liberty both can allow for
such interference, critics also contend that the republican and
negative conceptions of liberty are effectively indistinguishable.55
They claim that republican conception is inferior, however, because
it tends to mask inevitable tradeoffs, obscuring that some liberties
.
have been sacrificed to gain greater or more essential liberties 56
48. GREEN, supra note 47, at 228.
49. KELLY, supra note 30, at 55–56. Positive liberty seems to allow not only for the
existence of universal morality and rationality, but also for paternalistic state intervention aimed
at furthering individuals’ attainment of self-dominion.
50. BERLIN, supra note 44, at 131.
51. PHILIP PETIT, LEGAL REPUBLICANISM 287 (1997).
52. Id.; Besson & Martí, supra note 42, at 13–14.
53. Besson & Marti, Law and Liberty, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 51, at 39,
53.
54. KELLY, supra note 30, at 56–60.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Of these three, negative liberty—freedom as noninterference—is
the thinnest and arguably the most widely acceptable conception of
liberty. Negative liberty permits individuals to define and pursue
their own versions of freedom. Positive liberty circumscribes that
initial choice and instead empowers the state first to define
“authentic” freedom, then to coerce citizens into exercising it.
Noninterference is also a simpler and more transparent conception of
liberty than is the republican conception of non-domination.
Consider, for example, some instance where the state interferes with
individual liberty X to make possible the later enjoyment of a greater
liberty Y. If the operative conception is negative liberty, the state’s
action will constitute an interference with X—albeit an arguably
legitimate one. The conception of liberty as the absence of
interference logically implies the obverse—the presence of
interference is the absence (or reduction, perhaps, depending on the
extent of the interference) of liberty. In this way, negative liberty
makes transparent the tradeoff involved in securing the greater
liberty Y—sacrificing the lesser liberty X. If the operative conception
is republican liberty, however, the state’s action would constitute
noninterference, rather than legitimate interference with X. So
republican liberty obscures the tradeoff involved in securing Y. For
these reasons, and again surmising that the minimal conception will
be the least objectionable starting point, this analysis adopts negative
liberty as its operative conception.
To be clear, adopting negative liberty as the core value and
operative concept of liberty here is not the same as claiming that it
always trumps other values, nor that interference is always a bad
thing.57 John Locke, who championed individual liberty, understood
that without laws and some state interference, there would be no
liberty. He envisioned the state’s power as the aggregation of
individuals’ powers delegated to it with the understanding that the
state would then restrict some liberties of some individuals (e.g.,
restraining those who would wrongfully deprive others of “life,

57. One can make that argument, of course, as some libertarians do, claiming that the
only legitimate basis for state action is preserving individual liberty. See KELLY, supra note 30,
at 56–57. Making the argument, however, requires more than adopting a particular conceptual
analysis of liberty. The concept of negative liberty considers state action to be interference with
some aspect of someone’s freedom; but one who takes that view might nonetheless accept that
some other value (e.g., equality, justice, etc.) or policy goal justifies that interference. KELLY,
supra note 30, at 53–56.
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health, liberty, or possessions”) in order to maximize and preserve
the liberties of all.58
How might the state actualize its commitment to its core
abstract that value? The next two Parts derive from the state’s
commitment to liberty the ends that its policies should aim to
achieve. Part II.A.1 concludes that the state’s primary end is simply
safeguarding its citizens’ basic liberty; this is its minimum obligation
to its citizens. Achieving its primary end requires the state itself to be
stable and effective. Part II.A.2 thus concludes that the state’s
secondary end must be ensuring its continued existence, which it can
achieve only through citizens’ participation in its functioning; this
participation is the state’s minimum requirement of its citizenry.
Having thus identified the state’s primary and secondary ends,
the following Part (II.B.) next considers whether, and how, the state
should pursue its ends with respect to its immature citizens in
particular.
1. The state’s minimum obligations to citizens generally
If liberty is the state’s core value, then, at the risk of stating the
obvious, it follows that safeguarding its citizens’ liberty must be its
primary end. This guarantee is the state’s minimum obligation to its
citizens.
The conception of liberty guaranteed by the state is that of
noninterference, or negative liberty.59 To have liberty in the negative
sense requires the distinct personhood of the individual. In other
words, if a person can be free from the interference of others, the
person must have some capacity for meaningful existence separate or
distinct from others. A person lacks that capacity if her life is wholly
and ultimately decided by another—instead, the person effectively

58. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 144 (Henry Regnery Co.
1955) (1689). Even when negative liberty is the ideal, government in a populous and diverse
society must restrain some individual liberties to avoid harm to others and to safeguard the
liberty of all. A traffic regulation may require that motorists drive only in assigned lanes on one
side of the road, depriving them of the liberty to drive in other lanes or on sidewalks. But it
deprives them of the lesser liberty (the liberty to drive to a destination using any part of the
road or the sidewalk) in order to preserve the greater liberty (the liberty to drive to a
destination). (It also preserves pedestrians’ liberty to travel by foot without losing their lives.)
59. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
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becomes an extension of the other, and her life becomes an
expression of the other’s will.60
The basic liberty to decide one’s ultimate life course for oneself is
thus a minimum entitlement of the citizen in the liberal state.61 Its
complement is the absence in every other person of a liberty to
decide that citizen’s life course.62 The state’s liberty guarantee thus
confers on each citizen a claim, or right, to have the state withhold
from all other persons the right to be “other-determining.”63
The basic liberty to decide one’s life course entails at a minimum
choosing the social, moral, and political paths to which one will or
will not commit. The basic liberty to decide one’s life does not,
despite the ominous warnings of liberalism’s critics, require the
liberal citizen to be an unmoored individual, free from external
influence or community connection. No one leads an acontextual
life.64 As social beings, citizens are parts of families and communities

60. The U.S. Constitution captures the same notions in its guarantee against servitude
in the Thirteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Supreme Court’s definition of
slavery is “‘the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another.’” Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (quoting Webster’s Dictionary). Locke’s “natural State
of Freedom” is the contrapositive: the capacity to act “without asking leave, or depending on
the Will of any other Man.” LOCKE, supra note 28, at 287.
61. This discussion aims to keep to as plain a notion of decision making as possible. It
avoids concepts like “autonomy,” “autarchy,” “self-determination,” etc. Political theorists and
philosophers frequently use these terms to refer to the attainment of specific competencies or
ideals of personhood. Macedo, for example, defines autonomy as an “ideal of character” that
approximates the republican conception of liberty. MACEDO, supra note 26, at 216. He argues
that true autonomy requires “the capacity critically to assess and even actively shape not simply
one’s actions, but one’s character itself, the source of our actions.” Id. The “autarchic” person,
on the other hand, is capable of practical reasoning and choice but fails to critically evaluate
conventions and customs. Instead, he or she tends to adopt them uncritically. See JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 66 (David Spitz ed., 1975); MACEDO, supra note 26, at 216.
62. This is the correlativity thesis advanced by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, the
influential cataloguer of legal rights. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., 1923).
63. Just as one party’s liberty correlates to another party’s absence of liberty in
Hohfeld’s analysis of legal relations, a claim correlates to a duty. Id. See also, PAVLOS
ELEFTHERIADIS, LEGAL RIGHTS 107–14 (2008) (discussing Hohfeld’s model of legal
relations). The term “other-determining” here simply refers to the ability to determine or
control the life-course of another. I avoid the term “self-determining” for reasons stated in
supra note 62.
64. It is no shame to admit that John Donne put it better: “No man is an island, entire
of itself.” JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS
(1624).
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that embrace diverse values. In a liberal democracy, this is generally
to the good. Liberty leads to pluralism. Individuals pursue various
commitments according to their values, sometimes congregate in
communities with others who are like-minded, and usually endeavor
to pass their values on to their children.65 The liberal state
accommodates and respects the pluralism that results from liberty,
including inherited cultural and religious values.
But while the liberal state’s commitment to pluralism is broad, it
is not unlimited. The state may not permit majority, community, or
other individuals’ values to foreordain the individual citizen’s life
course. Parents and communities may transmit their values and
beliefs to the immature, but they may not deprive them of the
eventual ability to decide for themselves which of those values and
beliefs to accept or reject.
2. The state’s minimum requirements of citizens generally
Guaranteeing individuals’ basic liberty requires the continued
existence of the guarantor, the state itself. Ensuring its own existence
thus becomes a secondary end, and the state relies on its citizenry
generally to perform functions necessary to achieve that end. First,
citizens govern themselves. They sometimes do so directly but more
frequently indirectly, when they choose those who will represent
their interests in government. Their political participation ideally
safeguards their own liberty, by checking state power and creating
lawmaking bodies responsive to their general will (which presumably
reflects their general welfare). Second, citizens drive the nation’s
economy, their labor providing goods and services to meet society’s
needs. And third, citizens procreate and care for the young, the
state’s future.
Its citizenry’s performance of these functions ensures the state’s
continued existence and thus its ability to achieve its primary end,
citizens’ liberty. But at the same time, the state does not compel
65. This is especially true in a society characterized by immigration and religious
pluralism. Even absent the cultural and religious heterogeneity of the United States, however,
theorists posit that pluralism is an enduring and ineradicable social fact. This is, they argue, due
to the limits of human reason—we are not capable of developing universally acceptable
justification of fundamental issues like truth, justice, or the meaning of life. Because of the
importance of these issues, however, individuals strive to understand them, and having reached
some understanding, live their lives accordingly. The freedom to do so in the liberal state
enables individuals to determine their lives in this way. Pluralism itself thus becomes a
permanent fact of life and an important secondary democratic value.
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their performance by any particular citizen, because the state’s
primary commitment to citizens’ liberty restrains it from doing so.
Short of compulsion, though, state policies may create institutions
and structures that seek to ensure citizens’ capacity to perform these
necessary functions. Not all citizens will choose to perform all
functions. The state can nonetheless achieve this secondary end when
its citizenry collectively performs them.66
B. The State’s Minimum Ends with Respect to Immature
Citizens in Particular
At the risk of again stating the obvious, immature citizens
become mature ones. Thus to secure its ends, the state must attend
to its immature citizens and the duality inherent in their citizenship:
On the one hand, they at birth enjoy the legal status of citizens, who
happen to be immature.67 But on the other, they lack the political
and identity-related dimensions of citizenship and instead possess
merely the potential to exercise the liberties and perform the
functions of mature citizens. As such, they embody future mature
citizens.68 The state should pursue its ends with respect to both
young citizen-types. It otherwise risks failing twice over: first, with
respect to citizens during their immaturity, then again later, after
they have reached maturity.
This Part first establishes that immature citizens have a claim to
basic liberty, which the state must safeguard. The next Part, II.B.1,
then examines what it means for the state to pursue its minimum
ends—safeguarding citizens’ basic liberty—with respect to immature
citizens. Part II.B.2 concludes by analyzing what it means for the
state to pursue those ends with respect to the immature as future
mature citizens.
The immature are both distinct persons and citizens at birth,
despite their temporary dependence and other incapacities.69 The
66. The term “citizenry” here thus refers to the collective body. While individual
citizens might or might not choose civic participation, the collective citizenry must do so.
67. Theorists discuss three elements, or dimensions, of citizenship: legal, political, and
identity (which refers to the psychological dimension of membership in a political community
as a source of identity). See, e.g., Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally
Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 1–41 (W.
Kymlicka & W. Norman eds., 2000). The immature are born with the legal status of
citizenship but can later develop the political and identity dimensions of citizenship.
68. See id.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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state’s ends would seem to include this subset of its citizenry, at least
presumptively. Yet its ends seem inapplicable to the young; the very
incapacities that characterize immature citizens render them
generally unable either to exercise the basic liberty guaranteed by the
state or to perform the functions required by it. Indeed, because the
immature lack the capacity for rational choice, some theorists deny
that they can have a right to liberty at all.70
Theorists paint with too broad a brush, though, when they argue
that liberty requires the capacity for rational choice. It is true that
exercising certain specific liberties requires the capacity for rational
choice.71 But the conception of negative liberty itself contemplates
that liberty exists when others are restrained. Thus, when the state
restrains others from exercising absolute authority over immature
citizens, it ensures those immature citizens’ basic liberty.
By denying all others absolute, unchecked power over them, the
state ensures that even totally dependent immature citizens remain
distinct persons, not wholly subsumed by the will of another. It is
true that to affirmatively decide her life, the immature person must
first develop the capacity to do so. It is only once a person has
developed the capacity to exercise a specific liberty that she may be

70. John Stuart Mill, for example, suggested their non-right to be all but self-evident.
After asserting the now-famous liberty principle, Mill thought it “perhaps hardly necessary to
say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties.
We are not speaking of children . . . .” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE UTILITARIANS 484
(Doubleday 1961). See also, H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 192–97 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973); Hillel Steiner, Working Rights, in A
DEBATE OVER RIGHTS 261 (Matthew H. Kramer ed., 1998); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s
Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 802–03 (1999). For a
helpful overview and analysis of the philosophical debate, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 291–307 (2006). Dwyer sets forth the primary
arguments made both for and against the conceptual possibility of children’s having rights and
concludes that children can indeed be rights-holders.
71. It is for this reason that some theorists find it more useful to discuss specific liberties
to do specific things, rather than “liberty” generally. See, e.g., Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr.,
Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967). Thus, when the motorist’s specific
liberty to drive on the sidewalk to his destination clashes with the pedestrian’s specific liberty to
walk on the sidewalk to her destination, and the state interferes, one can more readily identify
which specific liberty is restricted, which is preserved, and which greater, but still specific,
liberty is advanced (the liberty of all to travel). Though the difference seems subtle, this
construction more readily accommodates the sometimes necessary interferences with liberty—
when liberties clash, interference may guarantee the more important liberty (however defined)
or maximize the total enjoyment of liberty (however measured). Adding the notion of specific
liberties thus retains the negative ideal of liberty as the absence of restrictions and compulsions,
without resort to a cartoonish conception of all interference with “individual liberty” as bad.
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said to have an interest in doing so, if not a right. But persons may
have basic liberty prior to developing those capacities.72
The immature are thus citizens entitled to basic liberty. The next
two Parts (II.B.1 and II.B.2) consider the implications of this
conclusion. They address first the state’s pursuit of its ends with
respect to the immature as current citizens and then with respect to
the immature as future citizens.
1. As citizens who happen to be immature
Because the immature are both distinct persons and citizens, the
state must endeavor to meet its minimum obligation to them during
(and despite) their immaturity—it must guarantee their basic liberty.
This does not require the state to bestow on them specific liberties
that they do not yet have the capacity to exercise. Indeed, because of
the very dependency that characterizes the immature, the state
designates parents to be their default caregivers and grants them
significant authority to carry out that role.73 But if the state were to
defer absolutely to a child’s parents, then the parents’ will would
control the child’s life and extinguish his distinct personhood.
Parents would have total dominion over their children’s lives—
whether they lived or died, whether they endured brutal discipline or
cruel neglect, whether they received an education, etc.74 Absolute
deference thus empowers the parent to decide the child’s life,
contrary to the minimum requirement of individual liberty.
Ensuring the basic liberty of the immature thus requires the state
to withhold from parents absolute or unchecked authority over
them. To do otherwise affords parents the right to be otherdetermining—an entitlement fundamentally inconsistent with the

72. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 98–104 (2004)
(summarizing deontological arguments that, as humans, children have a right to liberty, given
that human self-ownership is universal).
73. See infra Part III.
74. In colonial families, fathers in particular were granted virtually absolute authority
over their dependent children. An advice book published in the early part of the seventeenth
century cautioned parents to “provide carefully for two things: first that children’s wills and
willfulness be restrained and repressed . . . . Children should not know, if it could be kept from
them, that they have a will of their own, but in their parent’s keeping.” JOHN J. ROBINSON,
OF CHILDREN AND THEIR EDUCATION (1628), quoted in Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History
and Family Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 197, 201. Indeed, in several early colonies, the penalty
for filial disobedience was death. Id.
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minimum obligation of the state to all of its citizens. Parents’
childrearing authority must thus be something less than absolute.
The immature do not have the capacity to exercise the residual
authority over their lives that is withheld from parents, but the state
does. And the state claims this authority through its role as parens
patriae.75
The state’s assertion of its parens patriae power can serve two
functions: First, it can guarantee the basic negative liberty of the
immature by withholding from others absolute authority over them.
Second, it can pursue affirmatively the welfare of the immature by
asserting the interests that it believes the immature person would
advance herself, were she able to do so.76 The former role is arguably
more consistent with a negative conception of liberty and the limited
government it generally entails. The latter role is not necessarily
inconsistent with those views, especially if the state’s assertion of
authority is viewed as a proxy for the authority of the immature
person. However, the latter role tends to be implemented by courts
as an explicitly paternalistic interference and is somewhat less
consistent with negative liberty.77 Regardless, exercising its parens

75. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]
parent’s interests in a child must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as
parens patriae.” (internal citations omitted)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944). The concept, which means literally “parent of the country,” derives from the English
common law concept of pater patriae, or “father of the country.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *47. Pater patriae referred to the British Crown’s inherent power as
sovereign. In Britain, the Crown delegated its authority over domestic relations to the
chancery courts. Among their delegated duties, chancery courts assumed the obligation to
guard the interests of those unable to protect themselves. The crown then surrendered its
sovereign power to the democratic state once it attained independence. See Wheeler v. Smith,
50 U.S. 55, 78 (1850).
76. See DWYER, supra note 70, at 195–203.
77. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (noting that as parens patriae, the state performs a “most
beneficent” function, and its intervention must “often necessar[ily] . . . be exercised in the
interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves”). The U.S. courts expanded the concept of parens patriae well into the nineteenth
century, invoking the doctrine to uphold sweeping child protection statutes that authorized
significant state intervention into families. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1225–61 (1980). See generally Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae:
An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847 (2000) (discussing extension of parens patriae role to
allow states to assert various sorts of claims on behalf of their citizens). In the early twentieth
century, however, the Supreme Court reined in its use, noting that the state’s exercise of its
parens patriae power implicated and was limited by parents’ constitutionally protected rights in
childrearing, discussed further in the next Part. See generally Gregory Thomas, Limitations on
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patriae authority is a necessary liberty-protecting function of
government in the liberal constitutional democracy.
2. As future mature citizens
Guaranteeing citizens’ basic liberty during their immaturity is
necessary but not sufficient to ensure their future liberty. The state
must also attend to the effects this period will have on their lives as
future mature citizens, for it is during their immaturity that they
must develop the capacities to exercise the liberties and perform the
functions of mature citizens. This section thus identifies additional,
intermediate ends the state should pursue during citizens’
immaturity to help secure its minimum basic ends once they reach
maturity.
Again, the liberty to decide ultimately how one’s life will go—
choosing one’s social, moral, and political commitments—is a
minimum entitlement of the citizen in the liberal state.78
Guaranteeing that basic liberty is the state’s primary end. Its
secondary end is ensuring the citizenry’s capacity to perform those
functions essential to the state’s existence. Immature citizens lack but
should develop (absent infirmity or disability) the capacities to
exercise the liberties and perform the functions of citizenship.
The minimum obligation of the state with respect to the future
mature citizen is thus to deny all others the right to deprive
immature citizens of the ability to develop their capacities. It must
prevent during citizens’ immaturity the sorts of interference that
keep young citizens from developing the capacities essential for
citizenship.
Once citizens have attained these basic capacities, the state has
arguably achieved its minimum ends with respect to them. It cannot
force citizens to employ their capacities in any particular way. The
manner in which they choose to employ their capacities is ultimately
up to citizens themselves.
What must the state prevent—or require—during citizens’
immaturity in order to preserve their ability to make life-deciding
choices? At a minimum, having the capacity to decide one’s life
course means that one must be reasonably aware of one’s options

Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51
(2005).
78. See supra Part II.A.1.
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and have some reasonable ability to avail oneself of those options.
One cannot “choose” without knowledge of, and ability to pursue,
one’s alternatives.
Since all citizens are born into a certain social context, that
context—the community’s culture, their parents’ values and beliefs,
their material circumstances, etc.—will likely influence their eventual
preferences and choices. As discussed above, the liberal state expects
that immature citizens will experience these sorts of influences.79
When it ensures all citizens’ liberty (its minimum end), the state
allows them to pursue different conceptions of the good life. The
state—which is in the business of liberty-protecting, not good-lifeselecting—views the coexistence of competing conceptions of the
good life as a good in itself. Pluralism not only allows citizens to live
according to a given conception of the good life, it also enables
citizens to choose among different conceptions or choose the best
aspects of different conceptions to achieve what may be an improved
conception.80 In this way, respect for pluralism ensures individual
liberty and also paves the way for social progress.
As they go about pursuing their own conceptions of the good
life, citizens will form families and raise children. Expressing their
identities and living according to their values usually includes
instilling those values in their children and thus influencing their
conceptions of the good life.81 But influence unchecked becomes
imperative. The state must protect the immature from external
influence run amok, and that includes parental influence.82 The state
may thus legitimately restrain or constrain parents’ liberties in order
to guarantee the later basic liberties of the future mature citizen.
Having identified them, state actors must next determine how to
go about achieving the state’s ends with respect to the immature.
The state operates within a space defined by both constitutional
limits and political realities. Parents and the immature themselves
have interests and protected rights that may coincide with or diverge
from the state’s goals. State decision making must also account in
some principled way for these interests and rights.
79. See supra Part II.A.1.
80. See supra note 65 (discussing the argument that pluralism is an ineradicable fact in
the liberal state).
81. See infra Part III.
82. See supra Part II.A.1 (arguing that to achieve its basic end, the state must deny all
persons the right to be other-determining).
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This Part has identified the state’s minimum ends with respect to
both its mature and immature citizens. Parts III and IV respectively
examine parents’ and then immature persons’ interests and
constitutional rights. To better understand the trajectory of
immature citizens’ development to maturity and its potential
implications for policymaking, Part IV also surveys research on
development. Part V synthesizes the considerations of the previous
three Parts into a framework comprising a set of ends to guide state
decision making, and it proposes policies consistent with it.
III. PARENT CITIZENS
To be constitutional, state decisions affecting the immature must
respect the rights of their parents. But they must go beyond that: to
be successful, they must also heed the interests of parents.
The concept of family in the United States has always involved
notions of parental entitlement, authority, and responsibility.83
Under early common law, fathers had a “natural” right to control
their children, and paternal authority was absolute.84 Fathers also,
though, had a duty to protect and educate their children. By
performing that duty, they perfected their natural entitlement; in
exchange for protecting and educating them, fathers earned rights
over their children and their children’s labor.85
Parental authority itself has weakened (and is now genderneutral), but the rhetoric of strong parental rights endures.86 Both
83. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (acknowledging parents’
rights over and duties towards their children, observing that “[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Vivian
Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38–45 (2006) (discussing
historical concepts of paternal authority).
84. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452–53. See also Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 995, 1089–91 (1992) (discussing the historical view that children “belong[ed]
to parents”).
85. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 84 (describing children as the property of their fathers,
who had a presumptive entitlement to their custody, labor, and earnings in exchange for
providing for their care and education). See also Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing
Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (arguing as well that the notion of exchange was central
to historical conceptions of parents’ rights and obligations, stating that “[s]ince the earliest
days of the modern liberal state, parenthood has been expressed in terms of exchange: Parents
have rights with respect to their children in exchange for the performance of their parental
responsibilities.”).
86. See infra Part III.B.
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the natural rights and exchange views of parental rights persist.87 The
natural rights justification in particular, however, appears
infrequently.88 This decline likely reflects increasing respect and
concern for children as persons. Some scholars would extend that
respect and concern further. James Dwyer, for example, contends
that granting any individual a “right” to control the life of another
contravenes the legal and moral commitments of the liberal state.89
Illiberal qualities notwithstanding, today two basic arguments in
support of strong parental rights predominate. The first is
deontological: autonomy is the primary good, and parental rights
further parental autonomy. Those who espouse it tend to assume
that shaping one’s children’s lives is central to one’s selfdetermination, and that it is legitimately so.90 The second argument
for strong parental rights is instrumental, or utilitarian: it maintains
that deference to parental rights advances children’s welfare.91
This Part examines both parents’ interests in and rights to
childrearing. First, Part III.A addresses parents’ interests. While the
state has adopted an increasingly child-centered and thus
instrumental view of parents’ rights, many parents view strong childrearing rights as facilitating what is also for them an enduring act of

87. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 84 (arguing the persistence of the notion of
parental ownership of children); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,
81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2404 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he contract metaphor makes explicit what
is implicit in contemporary family law: parental ‘rights’ are granted as ex ante compensation for
the satisfactory performance of voluntarily assumed responsibilities to provide for the child’s
interests.”).
88. But see Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 937, 961–62 (1996) (making the “self-evident” argument that “the child belongs
to its parents. The child owes its conception to sexual intercourse between its mother and
father, and its birth to the reproductive labor of its mother . . . . As against the rest of the
world, the child is its parents’ ‘own’”).
89. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994) [hereinafter Dwyer, Parents’ Religion
and Children’s Welfare]. Dwyer suggests that parenting should be a privilege, not a right at all.
Part V.C.2, infra, considers these arguments.
90. Gilles, supra note 88, at 962–63.
91. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
6–8 (1973) (“To safeguard the right of parents to raise their children as they see fit, free of
government intrusion, . . . is to safeguard each child’s need for continuity.”); Emily Buss,
‘Parental’ Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 636 (2002) (arguing for strong constitutional
protection for parents’ child rearing authority, driven by an “assessment of its value to
children”); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 864 (2000) (arguing that parents’
rights derive from children’s interests).
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self-expression. Part III.B next analyzes the constitutional
jurisprudence of parental rights. This analysis reveals that the scope
of parents’ actual authority is weaker than the Supreme Court’s
rhetoric of strong parental rights suggests.92 This Part concludes by
assessing the implications of parents’ interests and rights for state
decision making with respect to the immature. It argues that parents’
rights as currently conceived impose few constraints on the state’s
ability to act to secure its ends. Parents’ interests, on the other hand,
pose a potential challenge but also a potential opportunity. Parents
overwhelmingly care deeply about parenting and can wield
significant influence over their children, and the state should
endeavor to accommodate their interests where possible. Such
accommodation engages them as partners in a collaborative childand future-citizen-rearing endeavor.
A. Parents’ Interests
Individuals generally consider forming and raising a family to be
essential aspects of their lives and self-identities.93 Stephen Gilles
asserts that “[t]he project of parenting—having, nurturing, and
educating one’s children—is central to our conception of human
flourishing.”94 And even in the compulsive context of legal academic
writing, Gilles—surely because it is so intuitive as to be virtually selfevident—cites no authority to support this proposition. Along the
same lines, some political theorists consider parenting to be one of
the core freedoms in the liberal state, because parenting represents

92. The Supreme Court most recently reiterated the rhetoric of “fundamental” parental
rights while simultaneously circumscribing parents’ rights in Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57
(2000). See David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Family, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 711 (2001) (arguing that Troxel limited rather than expanded parental rights by
failing to subject the challenged statute to strict scrutiny).
93. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 150–52 (1978) (“[T]he right to form
one’s child’s values [and] one’s child’s life plan . . . are extensions of the basic right not to be
interfered with in doing these things for one[’s] self.”). The Supreme Court has acknowledged
as much. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“[It is] plain beyond the
need for multiple citation that a natural parent’s desire for and right to the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any
property right.” (citations omitted)). See generally ARCHARD, supra note 72 (summarizing
arguments advanced to justify natural parents’ entitlement to raise their children, including
parents’ interests).
94. Gilles, supra note 88, at 962.
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one of the “central meaning-giving tasks” of life.95 Eamonn Callan,
for example, asserts that:
[T]he freedom to rear our children according to the dictates of
conscience is for most of us as important as any other expression of
conscience, and the freedom to organize and sustain the life of the
family in keeping with our own values is as significant as our liberty
to associate outside the family for any purpose whatever.96

For parents themselves, then, parenting is much more than an
instrumental endeavor; it is also an exercise in self-expression.
Another political theorist, William Galston, has elaborated pointedly
on the expressive aspects of parenting.97 He argues that parents’
expressive interests in raising children in accordance with their values
are “not reducible to their fiduciary duty to promote their children’s
interests.”98 Without eliding the importance of that fiduciary duty,
Galston reasons that parents’ self-expressive interests merit
consideration too, because through the “intimate particularity of the
parent-child bond, . . . [one’s] child is in part (though only in part)
an extension of ourselves.”99
It thus seems safe to conclude that parents’ primary interest with
respect to the immature is to raise their children as they themselves—
as opposed to the state—deem best. For most parents, this means
instilling their own values and beliefs in their children.100
B. Parenting as a Constitutionally Protected Right
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the existence
of a substantive right to parent that shields parents’ childrearing
decisions from unwarranted state interference. The magnitude and
contours of that right, however—like those of other rights relating to

95. EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 146–47 (1997).
96. Id.
97. William A. Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority Over Education
in the Liberal Democratic State, in CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE, NOMOS XLIV 211, 223–32
(Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 2003) [hereinafter Galston, Parents, Government,
and Children]. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE passim (2002).
98. Galston, Parents, Government, and Children, supra note 97, at 226–27.
99. Id.
100. See Gilles, supra note 88, at 965 (“[L]oving and nurturing a child cannot sensibly or
practically be divorced from shaping that child’s values.”).
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family life—are notoriously indistinct.101 What is clear is that the
right to parent is weaker than the Court’s rhetoric suggests.102
Although the Court regularly describes the right as fundamental, it
has employed something like true strict scrutiny only in cases where
state action has gone so far as to threaten the existence of the parentchild relationship itself.103 The singular exception has been Wisconsin
v. Yoder, where the Court required the state of Wisconsin to exempt
Amish students from compulsory school attendance laws.104 In
Yoder, however, parents’ childrearing rights combined with their
First Amendment free exercise claim to elevate the level of scrutiny
to which the Court subjected the state’s action.105
The following Parts briefly address the origins of the Court’s
parental rights jurisprudence, and then survey cases where the Court
evaluated state actions that interfered with parents’ childrearing
rights. This survey demonstrates that the Court subjects to strict
scrutiny state action that threatens to sever the parent-child
relationship altogether (Part III.B.2), but that it subjects to lesser
scrutiny state action that poses a lesser threat to that relationship
(Part III.B.3). Part III.C concludes by identifying the coherence
within the Court’s jurisprudence of parents’ rights, then assessing the
implications of those rights and of parents’ interests for state decision
making affecting the immature.

101. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 529
(2000) (“The Court’s family privacy cases have left pointedly unclear both what sorts of private
conduct are deserving of heightened protection and what form that protection should take.”).
102. See id. at 546 (arguing that in most parental rights cases, “the Court seems to apply
a more free-form ‘reasonableness’ test to government actions that impede a parent’s childrearing authority”); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning
of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 988–89 (1988) (suggesting that early parental rights
cases Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder provide little deference to parents’ rights per se; instead, parents’
rights receive fundamental protection only when combined with other constitutional rights,
like parents’ free exercise claims).
103. See infra Part III.B.2–3.
104. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny but implying that constitutional
interests other than the parents’ childrearing rights, namely their free exercise rights, justified
the application of that standard of review).
105. Id. See also McCarthy, supra note 102 (suggesting that it was only because parents’
rights in Yoder were tied to their free exercise claims that they were elevated to true
fundamental right status).
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1. Origins
The right to parent originates from a source most familiar in
constitutional law. It begins with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: “No state shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”106 A strict
reading of this text suggests that the Amendment offers procedural
protection but permits any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, so
long as the deprivation is accompanied by “due process of law.” The
Supreme Court, however, has rejected that strict reading. It has
instead interpreted the Due Process Clause to protect certain
substantive liberties from state interference.107
During what is known as the Lochner Era, extending from the
late 1890s to the late 1930s, the Supreme Court adopted a broad
view of constitutionally protected liberty interests and subjected even
economic legislation to “exacting review.”108 The Court’s holdings
in those cases repeatedly overturned legislation and constrained
legislative power.109
In two Lochner-Era cases, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, the Court for the first time interpreted “liberty” in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to provide substantive
protection for family autonomy.110 The cases did not centrally
concern parents’ liberty interests in childrearing, however; parents
did not join as parties in either case, and the Court focused as much
on the contractual liberty of educators as on the childrearing liberty
of parents.111 In Meyer, the Court invalidated state legislation
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
107. Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 70
(2006).
108. See, e.g., Moorehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kan., 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 4
(1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). But see Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE passim (1993).
109. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500–
03 (15th ed. 2004).
110. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
798 (3d ed. 2006).
111. See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1130–31 (2001); William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of
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restricting the teaching of foreign languages in public and private
elementary schools.112 In Pierce, the Court invalidated state
legislation requiring that all children be educated in public
schools.113
Although the Court later repudiated the economic due process
cases of the Lochner era, Meyer and Pierce remain good law, and the
Court invokes them as the foundations of its modern substantive due
process jurisprudence, which includes protection for parental
rights.114 The Court reads the two cases as having established “that
the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right
of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and . . . ‘to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.’”115
The Court in both Meyer and Pierce, while holding that states
had overstepped their bounds, also discussed the significance of the
state’s countervailing interest in its child citizens. The Meyer Court
observed “[t]hat the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in
order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally.”116 In Pierce, the Court similarly noted the expansive right
of states to regulate children’s educations, emphasizing that “[n]o
question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to
regulate all schools, . . . to require that all children of proper age
attend some school, . . . [and to require] that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught . . . ”117 It thus made
clear that its holdings left intact states’ power to mandate school

Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 178
(2000).
112. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. The same day it decided Meyer, the Supreme Court decided
Bartels v. Iowa, in which it invalidated Iowa, Ohio, and Nebraska statutes requiring that all
school instruction be conducted in English (the Nebraska statute had replaced the statute at
issue in Meyer). 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
113. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510.
114. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (citing Meyer and Pierce as
having established the right of parents to establish a home and direct the upbringing and
education of their children). See also Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental
Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72–73 (2006).
115. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (quoting both Meyer and Pierce). See also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (reading Meyer and Pierce as having established a
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” but upholding state legislation
restricting guardian’s right to permit her child to engage in street proselytizing).
116. 262 U.S. at 401.
117. 268 U.S. at 534.
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attendance and to dictate (at least to some extent) the content of
children’s education.
The Court next addressed a parental rights claim in Prince v.
Massachusetts.118 Though it is regularly cited to demonstrate the
Court’s respect for parental rights,119 Prince upheld the enforcement
of state child labor laws against a child’s guardian who asserted both
First Amendment freedom of religion and Fourteenth Amendment
parental rights and equal protection claims.120 The Court in Prince
acknowledged that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents” but held that the state’s power to protect
children’s welfare could, and in that case did, trump parental
authority.121
2. Modern treatment: threats to the existence of the parent-child
relationship
The Supreme Court has applied its most searching level of
scrutiny only when state action has threatened to end the parentchild relationship altogether.122 The Court has emphasized both the
potential significance and finality of such action,123 distinguishing it
from lesser interferences with the parent-child relationship, including
removal of a child from a parent’s custody.124
The cases in which the Court applied strict scrutiny have
concerned procedural violations of parental rights. In Stanley v.
Illinois, for instance, a state law placed the children of an unmarried
mother in the state’s care after her death, removing them from their
father’s care.125 The Court held the law unconstitutional, requiring
118. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
119. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (citing Prince as “confirm[ing] that there is a
constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children”).
120. 321 U.S. 158.
121. Id. at 165–66. The Court stated that “[a]cting to guard the general interest in
youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways.” Id. at
166.
122. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 838–45 (1999) [hereinafter Meyer, Family Ties].
123. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (describing
“termination of parental rights [as] both total and irrevocable”).
124. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (“In contrast to loss of custody, which does
not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination is ‘irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]’ of
the most fundamental family relationship.” (alterations in original; internal citations omitted)).
125. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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the state to show parental unfitness before terminating parental
rights.126 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court held that the government
must meet an elevated burden of proof—that of clear and convincing
evidence—before terminating parental rights.127
3. Modern treatment: lesser threats to parental authority
The Court distinguishes less drastic intrusions into parents’
rights, generally subjecting to something less than strict scrutiny
state interference that stops short of extinguishing those rights. In
doing so, it treats the right to parent in a way similar to the way it
treats the fundamental right to marry. With respect to the latter, the
Court has stated that:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we
do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter
into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.128

Yoder is probably the most prominent of the twentieth century
parental rights cases, though the importance of free exercise of
religion to its outcome clouds its place in the parental rights
firmament. Amish parents challenged a state statute requiring that all
children attend school until the age of sixteen.129 The Supreme
Court held in favor of the parents primarily because the statute
infringed on their free exercise rights, not because it infringed their
right to control the education of their children.130 Chief Justice
Burger emphasized this in his opinion for the Court:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if

126. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
127. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). But cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (finding that the state was not
required to provide a government-appointed lawyer for indigent appellants in all parental rights
termination proceedings).
128. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978) (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434
U.S. 47, n.12 (1977)) (emphasis added).
129. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
130. Id. at 215–16. See also McCarthy, supra note 102, at 988–89. McCarthy argues that
dicta in the Yoder opinion “indicate the view of Chief Justice Burger and others that the
parental right to control the education of his child should have minimal deference when it is
not tied to some other constitutional right.”
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it is based on purely secular considerations . . . [T]he very concept
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has
important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because
of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority, . . . their claims would
not . . . arise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.131

The Court also elected weaker scrutiny of state interference with
parents’ educational decisions in Runyon v. McCrary, dismantling
private, racially segregated schools and holding that parents’ right to
provide their children with a private school education was subject to
“reasonable governmental regulation.”132 The Court had earlier—
and strikingly—undercut parents’ influence in the schoolhouse by
affirming without opinion a lower court decision upholding a state
statute that permitted schools to corporeally punish children over the
objection of their parents.133
In the only modern case presenting it with the opportunity to
clarify the constitutional right of parents to control the upbringing of
their children, Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court instead
muddied the waters by declining to apply strict scrutiny.134 In Troxel,
a parent challenged a state third-party visitation statute that
permitted “any person” to petition a court for visitation rights with a
child “at any time.”135 Even if a parent objected, the court could
order visitation under the statute if it found that “visitation would
serve the best interests of the child.”136 The Court invalidated the
statute, but the case fractured the Court, leading to six separate
opinions.137 A concurring opinion by Justice Thomas (the most
protective of parents’ rights) and a dissent by Justice Scalia (the least
protective) bookended the other approaches taken by the Justices.
Justice Thomas criticized the Justices of the plurality for recognizing
131. 406 U.S. at 215–16.
132. 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).
133. Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975), aff’g 395 F. Supp. 294 (1975).
134. 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (holding that Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process
Clause provides “heightened protection” against state’s interference with parents’ right to
make decisions as to care, custody, and control of their children). See also Emily Buss, Adrift in
the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279 [hereinafter
Buss, Adrift in the Middle].
135. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1996).
136. Id.
137. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
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the fundamental right to parent but failing to apply the appropriate
standard of review. He wrote that he “would apply strict scrutiny to
infringements of fundamental rights.”138 Scalia, at the other extreme,
argued that there was no fundamental right to parent and would
have upheld the statute under a deferential standard of review.139
The remaining seven Justices, in four opinions, employed
language endorsing a fundamental right to parent, yet the Court
found the statute unconstitutional without reaching the scope of the
parental due process right, and without subjecting the statute to
strict scrutiny or a similarly heightened standard of review.140 Justice
O’Connor, writing for a plurality, instead found the statute
unconstitutional as applied, not because the state court had
intervened in the family, but because when it did so, it “failed to
accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any
material weight.”141
Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented, indicating that a bestinterest-based standard for third-party visitation cases could
sufficiently protect parents’ interests.142 Justice Kennedy emphasized
the changing nature of the modern family, rejecting “the assumption
that the parent or parents who resist visitation have always been the
child’s primary caregivers and that the third parties who seek
visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the
child.”143 Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of balancing a
parent’s interest against not only the state’s interest as parens patriae,

138. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 91–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. Custody and visitation cases involving children’s natural parents do not usually
raise constitutional issues. When they do—such as when aspects of a custodial determination
implicate a parent’s First Amendment free exercise right, courts frequently adopt a “harm”
standard. This standard is more protective of parents’ rights than the typical “best interests of
the child” standard. It requires that a court decline to intervene unless its inaction will lead to
definite and concrete harm to the child. See Lauren D. Freeman, The Child's Best Interests vs.
the Parent's Free Exercise of Religion, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 73, 81–84 (1998). When
the harm standard applies in the third-party visitation context, a court would decline to award
such visitation unless it found that failing to do so would result in harm to the child. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1998) (interpreting Virginia third-party visitation
statute to authorize entry of visitation order only upon finding that child would be harmed
absent such order).
141. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72 (plurality opinion).
142. See id. at 85–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 97–100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy observed that the “conventional
nuclear family . . . is simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many households.” Id.
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but also against the child’s own interest in preserving relationships.144
He further noted that “to the extent parents and families have
fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too,
must their interests be balanced in the equation.”145
Together, then, eight Justices of the Court declined to provide
parents significant protection from state intervention.146
Making doctrinal sense of the Court’s parental rights
jurisprudence thus requires some work. When addressing parents’
right to the care, custody, and control of their children, a majority of
the Court seems to use the “fundamental right” to parent as a
reassuring trope. Yet its retention of fundamental rights rhetoric
signals little more than the presumptive right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children. State action that interferes with parents’
authority yet stops short of threatening the existence of the parentchild relationship has yet to trigger explicit, true strict scrutiny review
by the Supreme Court.147
Despite the Court’s obfuscation, there is a simple coherence to
the variable nature of the parental right. When its very existence is
endangered, it is at its strongest. But when the state interferes with it
to any lesser degree, it is treated with far less deference.
C.

Implications: Parents’ Interests, Parents’ Rights

The implications of the Supreme Court’s parental rights
jurisprudence for state actors formulating policies affecting the
immature are clear: “[T]he state may do much, go very far,
indeed”148 to advance its ends before being considered to have
infringed parents’ rights.
The implications of parents’ interests for state decision-making
are less clear. Parents do care deeply about childrearing—so much so
that for many raising their children is an activity that is self-defining.
State actors may safely draw from this generalization two
conclusions. The first is a cautionary one: Policies affecting children
that fail to respect or account for their parents’ interests in

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 57. See also Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 134, at 284.
See Meyer, Family Ties, supra note 122, at 841.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
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childrearing have little chance of success. Parents have the
opportunity, as their children’s primary caregivers and those with the
most access to their children, to thwart state policy goals. The state
should avoid giving them a motive to do so. The second conclusion,
though, is more optimistic: State policies can, and should, take
advantage of parents’ preexisting tendencies to invest in their
children’s well-being. Parents’ nurturing can further and
complement the state’s ends. Identifying the most effective way in
which parents and the state might divide, or share, responsibility for
children that respects parents’ interests and achieves the state’s ends
is the state decision maker’s challenge.
IV. IMMATURE CITIZENS
Part II identified the state’s ends with respect to its citizens
generally, and the immature in particular. Part III first examined
parents’ interests, which the state should consider and account for
when making decisions affecting the immature, and then parents’
rights, which the state must consider and account for when doing so.
This Part explores the interests and rights of the immature
themselves, and the changes to both wrought by the course of their
development to maturity.
Part IV.A examines the interests of the immature. Part IV.B
surveys the contours of their constitutional rights. Part IV.C reviews
research in cognitive development to gain a better understanding of
the course of their developmental processes. This review discusses
behavioral and biological aspects of development, how external
factors can influence its course, and insights this research affords into
the capacities and deficiencies of the young as they develop to
maturity. It begins (in IV.C.1) with significant aspects of
development in infancy and early childhood, then discusses (in
IV.C.2) those of adolescence and young adulthood. Part IV.C.3
concludes by discussing those implications of this research that
ought to be of special concern to state decision makers, laying the
groundwork for the Article’s later contention that state actors in
judicial and legislative contexts should become better informed
about, and take better account of, development.
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A. Interests

All citizens, including the immature, have a minimum
entitlement to liberty, and it is the state’s duty to guarantee it.149
This Part goes beyond this basic entitlement, identifying interests
that the immature may have that do not necessarily impose
corresponding duties on the state or on other persons. As it is with
parents’ interests, it is nonetheless important to identify the interests
of the young, so that the state may consider them in its decision
making. The next Part surveys those specific interests that have
received special constitutional status and protection.
The interests of the young change dramatically as they develop
to maturity. But they can be said to have two basic categories of
interests: welfare interests and autonomy interests.150 Welfare
interests pertain to their well-being, irrespective of any affirmative or
rational choice they make. Autonomy interests refer to their interests
in making self-determining choices and having the freedom to
exercise the liberties of which they are capable.151
The immature have three basic welfare interests: First, they have
an interest in receiving care appropriate to the level of their
dependency; second, they have an interest in acquiring those
prerequisites necessary to attain their mature capacities—i.e., the
abilities required for them to exercise their basic, life-deciding
liberty; and third, they have an interest in being protected from their
own deficiencies.152
Their autonomy-related interest is even more straightforward, at
least conceptually: The immature have an interest in exercising those
specific liberties of which they are capable. Determining which
liberties they are capable of exercising, however, can present any
number of difficulties—even where researchers have identified
149. See supra Part II.B.1.
150. This nomenclature borrows from the language of rights. Theorists generally take the
view that rights derive from and protect either rational choice or autonomy only (the “Will
Theory of Rights”), or persons’ important interests or welfare more generally, independent of
choices they make (the “Interest Theory of Rights”). See DWYER, supra note 70, at 291–94.
See also LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 315
(2002) (characterizing children’s rights as comprising welfare claims and autonomy claims).
151. DWYER, supra note 70, at 291–94.
152. One might view this as part or derivative of their interest in dependency-appropriate
care. I note the third interest separately, however, to emphasize the possibility of immature
citizens’ welfare interests conflicting with their subjective autonomy interests.
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normative capacities, for example, there will be individuals whose
capacities vary from the norm. Part IV.C begins to address these
questions.
As it weighs policies, the state should consider and account for
the interests of the immature; but it must respect their rights. A brief
discussion of those of their rights addressed by the Supreme Court
thus follows.
B. Constitutional Rights
The state considers the immature to be rights-holders.
“Constitutional rights,” according to the Supreme Court, “do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority.”153 Though it has addressed children’s
rights under the Constitution in relatively few cases, when it has
done so the Court has consistently declared children to be “persons”
generally “protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults.”154 The Court has also
consistently asserted, however, that children’s rights are not
coextensive with those of adults, due to “the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
childrearing.”155 Whereas, for example, children have protected
speech and free exercise rights in public schools,156 those rights are
not identical to those afforded adults in other contexts. Instead, the

153. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that minors’ right to abortion
requires statutes imposing parental consent requirements also contain judicial bypass provision
allowing minor to seek judicial approval for procedure without first notifying her parents). See
also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (stating that “[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975)
(interpreting the Due Process Clause to require notice of charges and opportunity to be heard
prior to suspension from public school).
155. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. See also, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 682 (noting that
the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools “are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340–42 (1985))).
156. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that
the First Amendment protected students’ right to wear to school black arm bands in protest of
the Vietnam War without being subject to discipline); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited state from
compelling students to salute the flag in contravention of students’ religious beliefs).
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Court gives significant weight to the state’s countervailing interests
in maintaining control of the educational environment.157
Because of children’s less-than-competent decision-making
abilities, their parents have presumptive authority to make decisions
on their behalf, such as deciding their medical care.158 The Court has
implicitly recognized that even during their immaturity, however,
minors can acquire decision-making competence that entitles them
to some decisional autonomy. The Court has thus extended them a
right to privacy with respect to their intimate lives, enabling them to
access contraception and obtain abortions without having to notify
or obtain the consent of their parents.159 States wanting to require
minors to obtain parental consent to an abortion may impose such a
requirement only if they also provide an alternative procedure for the
minor to obtain authorization.160 The Court thus acknowledges
parents’ authority and interests in childrearing, but it withholds from
them an entitlement to veto the minor’s decision.161
In the juvenile courts, accused youthful offenders receive many
of the procedural protections guaranteed adults in the criminal
justice system.162 But whereas the Supreme Court implicitly
157. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that school’s interest in
preventing the promotion of illegal drugs outweighed students’ speech rights); Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (finding no First Amendment violation when
public school prohibited students’ use of “vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse”);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (finding due process did not require prior notice or
hearing before public school officials sanctioned student by beating with a paddle).
158. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that due process requires only
informal review by a neutral physician prior to a child’s being committed to a psychiatric
hospital based on application made by his parent).
159. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding unconstitutional
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen); Danforth, 428
U.S. at 74 (prohibiting state from conditioning minors’ access to abortion on parental
consent).
160. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622. The Court
has stated that a “bypass” option should permit an adolescent to obtain an abortion without
parental consent or notice if she establishes that she is mature enough to make the decision
independently, or if the decision maker determines that an abortion would be in her best
interests. Id. at 643–44.
161. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643. See also Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s Right
to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1131–32 (1999).
162. The Court has held that states must provide children procedural rights necessary to
ensure the “fundamental fairness” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967) (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)). The Court in
Gault required that juveniles charged with committing delinquent acts receive basic due
process protections, including the privilege against self-incrimination, rights to counsel, notice
of charges, and ability to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Gault, 387 U.S. at 10,
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recognizes adolescents’ decision-making abilities in the context of
decisions affecting their intimate lives, it explicitly recognizes their
continuing cognitive and decision-making deficiencies in the context
of their delinquent and criminal conduct. Thus in Roper v. Simmons,
the Court prohibited imposition of the death penalty for juveniles
younger than eighteen.163 In support of its decision, the Roper Court
reviewed and cited research in developmental psychology describing
typical characteristics of adolescents. These characteristics—including
immaturity, susceptibility to external pressure, and still-developing
identities—mitigate adolescents’ criminal culpability, compared to
adults.164 The research relied on by the Court demonstrates that
adolescents are different from adults in ways that directly bear on the
regulation of crime and juvenile justice policy.165 The Court later
relied on Roper’s assessment of the lesser culpability of adolescent
offenders when it decided Graham v. Florida, in which it prohibited

13. See also, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (interpreting the Due Process Clause in
juvenile delinquency cases to require the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600–01 (1948) (holding that persons under eighteen
prosecuted in the adult criminal justice system retain basic constitutional rights in those
proceedings). But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (holding that pretrial
preventive detention of juveniles does not constitute punishment, in part because “juveniles,
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody”); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545 (1971) (holding that right to jury trial not required by Due Process Clause during the
adjudicative stage of juvenile proceedings).
163. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
164. Id. at 569–70 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty
by Reason of Adolescence]; Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992) [hereinafter Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence]. Elizabeth Scott, a professor of law, and Laurence Steinberg, a professor of
psychology, have together and separately published numerous influential articles on adolescent
development and the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE
STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008) [hereinafter SCOTT & STEINBERG,
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE]; Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81
TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003). Scott has also addressed adolescence itself as a legal construct. See
Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000)
[hereinafter Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence].
165. See generally Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence, supra note 164; Steinberg &
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 164. But see generally Terry A. Maroney,
The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 89
(2009) (arguing that, despite the attention generated by the Supreme Court’s discussion of
adolescent brain development in Roper, the potential implications of the science of
development for juvenile justice are, and should be, limited).
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sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life imprisonment
without parole.166
The Court may appear to contradict itself by differently assessing
adolescent capacity in the privacy/medical decision-making and
juvenile justice contexts. The next Part (IV.C), however, surveys
research on adolescent decision-making capacities and deficiencies
that supports the Court’s approach.167
To the extent that researchers can reliably identify certain
contexts in which adolescents are likely to make competent
decisions, and others in which they are less likely to do so,
developmental science might usefully inform law or policy.
Understanding the sorts of decisions individuals have the capacity to
make, and the ages at which they develop the capacity to make them,
can help ensure that young citizens get the liberties they are capable
of exercising. Understanding their decision-making deficiencies may
help prevent immature citizens from getting liberties that they may
not yet be competent to handle. A basic understanding of the
development of decision-making competence may thus better equip
state actors to make specific policies or render judgments appropriate
to those whom the policies or judgments will affect.
There is more to development than the acquisition of decisionmaking competence, however. State actors who understand
developmental processes more generally may additionally find that
understanding those processes (their timing, the factors that
influence them, etc.) alerts them to policymaking opportunities
where they might act selectively yet effectively to further the state’s
policy goals with respect to its developing citizens. The policies
advanced in Part V respecting the parent-child relationship and
education seek to achieve this sort of coherence and efficacy.
C. The Science(s) of Development
This Part discusses cognitive development, from infancy through
emerging adulthood. Those who study development approach the
rapidly developing field from multiple disciplines (developmental
166. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
167. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?, Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 6 AMER.
PSYCH. 583 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?] (describing
research on psychological development that supports the Supreme Court’s decisions in both
Hodgson and Roper).
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psychology, cognitive neuroscience, etc.)168 and study developmental
processes at multiple levels (behavioral, psychological, biological,
etc.). 169 This survey accordingly draws on a range of disciplines and
analytical approaches from within developmental science. While law
and policy formally operate at the behavioral level, explaining
developmental processes at other analytical levels can shed light on
behavioral phenomena and potentially inform ways in which policy
might shape it. For example, a neurobiological explanation of the
experience-dependent maturational processes of early childhood
might inform the most effective timing and nature of early
educational interventions.
A comprehensive, technical discussion of cognitive development
is beyond the scope of this Article (and the expertise of its author).
Its more modest aim is to describe aspects of development that can
and ought to be understood—and, where appropriate, accounted
for—by those concerned with law and policy affecting the immature.
The survey gives special attention to two aspects of cognitive
development: The first is the effect of external influence on
development. Human development occurs, of course, not in a neural
vacuum but within an environmental and experiential context.
Researchers have long known that that environment and experience
can enrich, or constrain, the neurobiological and cognitive
development that occurs in infancy and early childhood.170 But only
in the last decade or so have they begun to develop a similarly
sophisticated understanding of the developmental mechanisms that
take place later—in adolescence and beyond—and to consider the
168. See., e.g., Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of
Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 160 (2010) [hereinafter,
Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development]; James P. Byrnes, Cognitive Development During
Adolescence, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 227 (Gerald R. Adams & Michael
D. Berzonsky eds., 2003).
169. Significant overlap and cross-fertilization occur among these approaches. To give
just one example, in Adolescent Brain Development, developmental psychologist Laurence
Steinberg describes advances in the developmental neuroscience of adolescence that might be
“of special interest to those who study adolescent behavioral development.” Steinberg,
Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 160.
170. See, e.g., William T. Greenough, James E. Black, & Christopher S. Wallace,
Experience and Brain Development, 58 CHILD DEV. 539 (1987). See also, Eric I. Knudsen et
al., Economic, Neurobiological, and Behavioral Perspectives on Building America’s Future
Workforce, 103 PNAS 10,155, 10,155–60 (2006) (surveying studies across various disciplines
concluding that early childhood experience influences later capacity for economic productivity,
temperament and social development, perceptual and cognitive abilities, brain architecture, and
gene expression and neurochemistry).
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potential effects of experience on these later developments in brain
structure and function.171 Understanding these effects might inform
the educational or other experiences the state may wish its
developing citizens to have. Whether/how to actualize its preference
will then depend on the whole range of considerations that attend
any policymaking decision.
The second aspect of development that will receive special
attention here relates to changes over time in distinct mental
capacities and deficiencies that relate to decision making, and the
factors that support or hinder individuals’ performance.172 As noted
above, understanding the developmental trajectory of these capacities
can shed light on the types of decisions otherwise-immature
individuals might competently make, and the ages at which they are
most likely to become capable of making them. Conversely,
understanding deficiencies may prompt a reevaluation of other
liberties individuals may currently exercise, despite their incapacity to
do so responsibly.
Developmental mechanisms involve some combination of (1)
genetically-driven neural processes, (2) the full range of
environmental conditions within which development occurs, and (3)
individual experiences during the course of development.173
The following sections outline significant aspects of
developmental processes, first in infancy and childhood, then
through adolescence and into emerging adulthood.

171. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 160–61. Steinberg
observes that, in the last decade, “the developmental neuroscience of adolescence has matured
from a field in its infancy to one that is now approaching its own adolescence.” Id. See also,
Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COG.
SCI. 69, 73 (2005) [hereinafter, Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development]. Researchers
have begun to posit that emerging adulthood is a distinct developmental period spanning ages
eighteen to twenty-five. See infra Part IV.C.2.
172. For discussions of the capacities employed in decision making, see infra Part IV.C.2;
SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 36. See generally
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION
AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 52–59 (2010).
173. Sharon E. Fox, Pat Levitt & Charles A. Nelson III, How the Timing and Quality of
Early Experiences Influence the Development of Brain Architecture, 81 CHILD DEV. 28, 31
(2010); Arthur W. Toga et al., Mapping Brain Maturation, 29 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES
148, 148 (2006).
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1. Infancy and childhood
Beginning early in gestation, genetic scripts orchestrate the
highly structured development of the central nervous system in a
process that is relatively impervious to experience or environment.174
Well before birth, the brain’s basic structures and nerve cells are in
place.175
Following birth, genetically-driven neural development in
significant respects gives way to experience-driven neural
development.176 Postnatal experiences that range from exposure to
ubiquitous environmental information (like the constantly shifting
contrasts and patterns that are the visual input from one’s
surroundings) to the acquisition of specific information unique to
the individual’s environment stimulate the physiological activity that
will sculpt the still-forming brain.177 Thus “extrinsic sensory cues are
essential for the proper development of neural circuitry during early
postnatal life.”178 Researchers have gained significant, though still
incomplete, understanding of the processes by which early
experiences influence both the structure and function of the
developing brain.179 A brief description of these follows.
Some of the most critical (and well-studied) changes in the brain
take place in the cerebral cortex, which handles many of the brain’s
functions, such as vision, hearing, speech, planning, and emotional
control.180 Distinct cortical regions specialize in processing different

174. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 29–31. These mechanisms are not altogether
impervious to environmental influences, however, and prenatal exposure to drugs, alcohol,
toxins, etc. may disrupt the expression of genes that regulate early development. Id. at 30–31.
175. Susan L. Andersen, Trajectories of Brain Development: Point of Vulnerability or
Window of Opportunity?, 27 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 3, 4–5 (2003); Charles
A. Nelson, Change and Continuity in Neurobehavioral Development: Lessons from the Study of
Neurobiology and Neural Plasticity, 22 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 415, 416–20 (1999).
176. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 29–31.
177. In an influential series of papers in the mid-1980s, William Greenough and
colleagues first outlined these processes. See, e.g., Greenough et al., supra note 170, at 540.
178. Steven W. Flavell & Michael E. Greenberg, Signaling Mechanisms Linking Neuronal
Activity to Gene Expression and Plasticity of the Nervous System, 31 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE
563, 564 (2008).
179. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 31 The genetic code thus provides the initial blueprint
for brain structure, but “it must be understood as a framework upon which many
environmental factors influence future structure and function.” Id.
180. Tomas Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During
Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COG. SCI. 60, 60 (2005) [hereinafter Paus, Mapping Brain
Maturation].
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types of information.181 Nerve cells, or neurons, transmit information
throughout the brain in the form of electrical or chemical impulses.
A typical neuron consists of a cell body that develops two types of
branching filaments—dendrites, which receive impulses from
adjoining neurons, and an axon, which in turn transmits impulses on
to the next neuron.182 The point of contact between two neurons is
called a synapse. Some synapses pass electric current from the axon of
one neuron to a dendrite of the next; other synapses trigger the
release of chemical “messengers” (e.g., neurotransmitters) which
then stimulate receiving neurons.183
The brain initially produces an overabundance of relatively
unstable synaptic connections.184 When an individual then
experiences stimulation from her environment, that sensory
experience stimulates neuronal activity—the electrical or chemical
impulses that process sensory stimuli; neuronal activity in turn
activates the synaptic connections.185 It is only after a synapse has
been repeatedly activated that it strengthens and stabilizes.186
Unused or infrequently used synapses eventually regress and
disappear.187 This activity-dependent process, known as “synaptic
pruning,” improves the speed and efficiency of information
processing and computational capacity within regional neural

181. Id.
182. Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 565–66.
183. CHARLES A. NELSON ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: THE
ROLE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN 24 (2006).
184. See Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 566 (discussing synaptic activity at the
neuromuscular junction, the synapse formed by motor neurons onto muscle cells); Gert
Westermann et al., Neuroconstructivism, 10 DEV. SCI. 75, 76–77 (2007) (discussing synaptic
activity in areas of the primary visual cortex). See also, Rhoshel K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd,
Brain Development in Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 718, 719–20 (2006). The
proliferation and organization of synapses begin around the twentieth week of gestation. Id. at
719. Synaptic density peaks at different times in different regions of the brain. Id. at 719–20.
In the visual cortex, for example, maximum density occurs at four months after birth; in the
medial prefrontal cortex, it does not occur until age three to four. Id.
185. Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 565–67. Under experimental conditions,
synaptic connections can form in the absence of physiological activity, but in general,
“experience is essential for the normally occurring regulation of . . . synapse formation.” Fox et
al., supra note 173, at 31; Toga et al., supra note 173, at 148.
186. NELSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 27.
187. Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 566.
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circuitry (such as the visual or auditory cortex).188 Synaptic pruning is
a critical component of neural maturation; it “makes the brain more
efficient by allowing it to change structurally in response to the
demands of the environment . . . [and] results in increased
specialization of brain regions.”189
Neural connections that survive the pruning process typically
become encased in a sheath of myelin, an insulating lipo-protein.190
This process, known as myelination, significantly increases the speed
of impulse transmission (as much as 100-fold) along existing neural
connections.191 Myelination enables functionally distinct regions of
the brain to efficiently integrate their functioning across a widely
distributed neural circuitry, thus supporting complex behavior.192
Synaptic overproduction and pruning and myelination are the
primary processes by which neural circuits mature. The proliferation,
stabilization, and pruning of synapses establish neural connections

188. Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and Cognitive
Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 216 (2009); Flavell &
Greenberg, supra note 178, at 566 (noting that only “a subset of [excess] synapses are
strengthened while others are eliminated. This elimination process depends on sensory
experience and synaptic activity”). See also, NELSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 31; Beatriz
Luna, Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control Through Adolescence, in ADVANCES IN
CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 237–38 (Patricia Bauer, ed., 2009) [hereinafter
Luna, Developmental Changes]; Toga et al., supra note 173, at 148.
189. Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 217
(2009). On brain images, synapses and neural cell bodies appear as “gray matter” (and are
often referred to as such), whose volume or density researchers measure to determine the
course of neural maturation. See Nitin Gogtay & Paul M. Thompson, Mapping Gray Matter
Development: Implications for Typical Development and Vulnerability to Psychopathology, 72
BRAIN & COGNITION 6, 7 (2010). Gray-matter density decreases to mature adult levels earliest
in areas that process the most basic functions, such as sensory and motor skills. Toga et al.,
supra note 173, at 149–50. See generally Tomas Paus, Growth of White Matter in the Adolescent
Brain: Myelin or Axon?, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 26, 31–32 (2010) [hereinafter Paus, Growth
of White Matter]. The visual cortex (located in the occipital lobe of the cerebral cortex), for
example, reaches maturity by age seven; the auditory cortex (in the temporal lobe), by age
twelve. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 237.
190. Johnson et al., supra note 189, at 217.
191. Toga et al., supra note 173, at 148.
192. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 238–39. On brain images,
myelinated axons show up as measurable “white matter”. Paus, Growth of White Matter, supra
note 189, at 7 (reporting increasing volume of white matter in a study of individuals from ages
five to twenty-five years of age); Vincent J. Schmithorst & Weihong Yuan, White Matter
Development During Adolescence as Shown by Diffusion MRI, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 16, 19
(2010) (reporting increase in volume and density of white matter up to “young adulthood”).
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within and between cortical regions.193 Myelination significantly
improves these connections, with its dramatic effects most apparent
along the extensive neural circuits that connect distant cortical
regions.194
Synaptic overproduction and pruning occur at different,
genetically-programmed times in the various regions and neural
circuits of the brain. These defined periods of circuit maturation are
generally referred to as “sensitive” periods, during which a circuit’s
synapses are especially receptive to stabilization by appropriate
external stimuli.195 Connections not activated by the individual’s
activity and environment during the sensitive period will likely be
weakened or lost.196 Thus, “[i]n the process of synaptic pruning, . . .
the environment determines which synapses will be kept and which
will not be needed[,] but biological mechanisms determine the times
in development when different parts of the brain will be most
affected.”197
Studies confirm the importance of appropriate environmental
and sensory experience during sensitive periods.198 In landmark
studies of the visual system, for example, vision occlusion in one eye
shortly after birth led to the elimination of neural connections
between the disadvantaged eye and the visual cortex.199 When the
visual occlusion extended beyond the sensitive period (after which
that neural circuit had matured), the major effects were irreversible;
the neural circuit did not develop normal architecture and function,
even after restoration of visual input to the disadvantaged eye.200

193. Schmithorst & Yuan, supra note 192, at 27. See also, Toga et al., supra note 173, at
149–50 (discussing the use of cortical mapping to study developmental processes).
194. Paus, Growth of White Matter, supra note 189, at 7; Schmithorst & Yuan, supra note
192, at 27.
195. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 235.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Andrea Berger et al., Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Attention and the
Development of Self-Regulation, 82 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 256, 263–64 (2007)
(discussing studies). See generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 183.
199. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 31–32 (discussing a series of studies conducted in the
mid-1960s by Wiesel and Hubel and reported in T.N. Wiesel & D.H. Hubel, Extent of
Recovery from the Effects of Visual Deprivation in Kittens, 28 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1060
(1965), and T.N. Wiesel & D.H. Hubel, Single-cell responses in Striate Cortex of Kittens
Deprived of Vision in One Eye, 26 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1003 (1963)).
200. Berger et al., supra note 198, at 263.
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Relevant sensory experience during sensitive periods thus supports,
and its absence constrains, normal development.201
Developmental scientists study the trajectory of development at
different analytical levels. At the cognitive level, the development of
basic sensory and motor skills precedes the maturation of higherorder executive skills and association processes (which include
attention and language processes and sensorimotor integration).202
The higher-order processes continue to develop into adolescence.203
Development at the neurobiological level parallels the course of
cognitive development. Thus, within a given neural hierarchy, the
neural circuits that process lower level or more basic information
mature before those that process higher-level information. In the
visual neural hierarchy, for example, the low-level circuits that
analyze color or motion mature before the high-level circuits that
analyze faces.204
Normal development of the low-level circuits supports
development of higher-level circuits. To give another example from
the visual system, studies found that when congenital cataracts
caused early visual deprivation, subtle but permanent deficits
remained in the later-developing ability to process faces—even when
the cataracts were removed in the first months of life.205 The laterdeveloping perceptual processes thus build on the earlier normal
development of the basic visual system.206 The process where initial
learning can constrain later learning, referred to as entrenchment,
also occurs in the development of other systems, including speech.207

201. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 32. Another well-studied example of a complex
cognitive ability shaped by early experience is language acquisition. Young children readily
acquire native proficiency in a second language, whereas adults acquire a second language only
with great effort—and the level of proficiency is never as fluent or complete as with earlyacquired language. Knudsen et al., supra note 170, at 10157–59.
202. Schmithorst & Yuan, supra note 192, at, 17, 19. See also, Luna, Developmental
Changes, supra note 188, at 238. In the visual cortex, for example, synaptic pruning is
complete by preschool age, whereas in the medial prefrontal cortex, substantial pruning does
not occur until mid- to late-adolescence. Evidence also suggests that synaptic pruning occurs
into adolescence in “association areas” that connect different regions of the brain and, like
myelination, support complex integration of function. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra
note 188, at 238–39.
203. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 237–38.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 32.
206. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 32.
207. Id.
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The genetic and neurobiological bases of sensitive periods, along
with the hierarchical development of neural circuits that leads to
entrenchment, help explain the importance to an individual’s
development of environment and experience, and the importance of
receiving appropriate experiences at developmentally appropriate
times.
Direct observations of the long-term effects of early experiences
typically occur at the behavioral level.208 For example, studies of the
long-term effects of high-quality early intervention programs for
disadvantaged children—variously including high-quality foster care,
day care, and early childhood education programs—found dramatic
increases in intelligence quotients and other positive social and
economic outcomes later in life.209 Researchers have posited that
“[l]ow-level circuits whose architecture was shaped by healthy
experiences early in life provide high-level circuits with precise, highquality information. High-quality information, combined with
sophisticated experience later in life, allows the architecture of
circuits involved in higher functions to take full advantage of their
genetic potential.”210
Developmental neuroscientists studying later-occurring brain
maturation have discovered that significant growth and change
continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood.211 The
following Part discusses both behavioral and neurobiological
characteristics of this later period of development.
2. Adolescence and emerging adulthood
Adolescence is the developmental period between childhood and
adulthood and is commonly characterized as spanning ages twelve to
seventeen.212 Universal characteristics of adolescent behavior include
increased risk taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity.213 During

208. Id. at 34–35.
209. Id. (citing study in which children institutionalized at birth were placed in highquality foster care before the age of two years); Knudsen et al., supra note 170, at 10155–56
(citing studies in which disadvantaged children were placed in different intervention programs,
either at preschool age or approximately four months).
210. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 35.
211. Johnson et al., supra note 189, at 216; Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective
Development in Adolescence, supra note 171, at 69–70.
212. Geier & Luna, supra note 188, at 212.
213. Johnson et al., supra note 189, at 218.
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this period, a host of undesirable behavior patterns—alcohol and
substance abuse, criminal activity, reckless driving, smoking, etc.—
tends to make its unfortunate debut.214 Adolescents and young
adults are more likely than adults over twenty-five to binge drink,
engage in violence, commit crimes, have casual sex, and suffer
serious or fatal automobile accidents, most of which they cause by
driving under the influence of alcohol or engaging in other risky
driving behaviors.215
Developmental scientists argue that the emergence of these sorts
of adolescent behaviors makes “perfect evolutionary sense,” since
sensation seeking and risk taking have presumably long motivated
adolescents of all cultures and species to leave their natal
environments and seek out mates.216 Scientists acknowledge that in
today’s society, however, the behaviors that express this
developmental pattern, despite having been selected for by
evolution, “may be deemed inappropriate.”217 Whatever their
origins, public health experts today agree that reducing adolescent
risk-taking behaviors would improve society’s overall well-being.218
Behavioral decision models initially posited that adolescents’
cognitive deficiencies led them to misperceive risks and disregard the
long-term consequences of their behavior.219 Accordingly, state
interventions sought to correct their misperceptions by educating
adolescents about commonly encountered risks. These education
efforts often included skills components, in which adolescents
learned practical methods for dealing with situations presenting risk
214. Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision
Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 8
(2006). See also, Michael Windle and Rebecca C. Windle, Alcohol and Other Substance Use and
Abuse, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 450–63 (Gerald R. Adams and Michael
D. Berzonsky eds., 2003) (reporting empirical studies on initiation and escalation of substance
use among adolescents).
215. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28
DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 78, 79 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking].
216. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 161; B.J. Casey et al.,
The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 70 (2008).
217. Casey et al., supra note 216, at 70. Authors of a review of adolescent risk taking
eschew the understatement that characterizes Casey et al.’s characterization of the
contemporary effects of risk taking, observing that the “decisions that are encouraged by
evolution appear to make people stupid in the modern world, . . . and they encourage
unhealthy risk taking rather than discourage it.” Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 4.
218. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 79. See also, Reyna & Farley,
Risk & Rationality, supra note 214, at 8.
219. Reyna & Farley, Risk & Rationality, supra note 214, at 33.
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(e.g., role playing ways in which to reject proposed sexual activity).220
Studies of these well-intended interventions, however, have found
them to be largely ineffectual in changing adolescent behavior.221
The early behavioral models, moreover, have failed to find
empirical support. Researchers have sought to identify cognitive
differences between adolescents and adults that could explain their
different propensities for risk-taking behavior. Examples of such
differences could include, for example, higher levels of irrationality
among adolescents, lower levels of risk aversion, or deficiencies in
either information processing or risk perception relative to adults.222
None of these efforts, however, has borne empirical fruit.
To the contrary, researchers have consistently found that “[t]he
logical reasoning and basic information-processing abilities of 16year-olds are comparable to”223 or “essentially indistinguishable” 224
from those of adults. General cognitive capacity—i.e., the abilities to
process information, understand and reason from facts, and assess
and appreciate the nature of a given situation—improves into midadolescence.225 By age sixteen, these basic cognitive abilities are
mature.
Researchers have thus reached the counterintuitive conclusion
that adolescents engage in higher rates of risky, seemingly irrational
behavior than do adults despite being “as knowledgeable, logical,
reality-based, and accurate in the ways in which they think about
risky activity . . . as their elders.”226 Cognitive deficiencies thus do

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. at 33 (citing studies).
Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 80.
Id.
Id. See also, R. MURRAY THOMAS, COMPARING THEORIES OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 298–99 (3d ed. 1992); Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development, supra
note 171, at 70; June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 911–12 (2008); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd,
Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 324 (2006);
Beatriz Luna et al., Maturation of Cognitive Processes from Late Childhood to Adulthood, 75
CHILD DEV. 1357 (2004); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 164, at 812–13.
Compared to children and preadolescents, adolescents develop increased cognitive
abilities, including improved executive function, which refers to the higher-order cognitive
system that manages other cognitive functions such as abstract thinking, planning (e.g.,
thinking through the likely consequences of actions), and inhibiting (or executing) behavior.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 44.
225. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 167, at 590–92.
226. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 80.
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not account for adolescents’ propensity for risky and impulsive
decision making, with studies confirming that adolescents have the
cognitive competence to make rational decisions about risks.227 Why,
then, do they frequently fail to do so?
Behavioral scientists have examined more closely the real-world
contexts in which adolescents make decisions, and in so doing they
have gained valuable insights into differences between adolescent
and adult decision-making processes. Their findings do not challenge
adolescents’ competence to make rational decisions about risks—at
least when that decision making occurs in the relatively ideal
conditions of the research laboratories in which adolescents complete
tasks involving minor, symbolic risks.228 The real world seldom
presents ideal conditions, however, and researchers have found that
the real-world contexts in which adolescents make decisions can
drastically affect the quality of their decision making.229
Contexts found to predictably compromise adolescent decision
making include those requiring them to make decisions “in the heat
of passion, in the presence of peers, on the spur of the moment, in
unfamiliar situations, . . . [and] when behavioral inhibition is
required for good outcomes.”230 In other words, adolescents tend to
make bad decisions in emotionally charged or pressured situations,
and they struggle to control impulses that lead to undesirable
behavior. Studies of their decision making have more generally
shown that, even though they do not generally misperceive risks (if
anything, studies have tended to show that adolescents and adults
both overestimate risk), adolescents tend to weight and value
benefits more heavily than risks, as compared to adults.231
Developmental scientists are rapidly gaining a better
understanding of neurobiological aspects of adolescent development
227. Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 2.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1; Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study,
41 DEV. PSYCH. 625, 625 (2005).
230. Id. See also, Eric Amsel et al., Anticipating and Avoiding Regret as a Model of
Adolescent Decision-Making, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 119, 120 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005).
Researchers of cognitive ability have referred to this as the “competence-performance
distinction.” Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying
Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996) (internal
citations omitted).
231. Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 1.
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that have the potential to explain its most confounding behavioral
aspect—the increase during adolescence in both irrational risk-taking
behavior and rational decision-making capacity.232 Developmental
psychologist Laurence Steinberg has recently emphasized
importance—to all disciplines within developmental science—of
research in developmental neuroscience, suggesting that this research
has the “potential to structure a new, overarching model of
normative . . . adolescent development.”233
Scientists have thus begun developing a neurologically-based
model primarily oriented around the development in two neural
systems: that associated with cognitive control, and that associated
with socio-emotional maturity. The core insight of this model, which
some call the “dual systems model,” is that the neural systems
associated with cognitive control on the one hand, and those
associated with socio-emotional maturity on the other, develop
along different timelines.234 This temporal disjunction has the
potential to explain (1) adolescents’ risk taking and poor decision
making despite their improved cognitive ability, (2) other aspects of
adolescent psychology and behavior, such as heightened
susceptibility to peer influence, and (3) the developmental trajectory
of all these over the course of the adolescent’s transition to
adulthood.235 An overview of the model’s features follows.
The first neural system of the dual systems model is what some
researchers refer to as the socio-emotional system; it includes neural
circuitries across regions of the brain implicated in aspects of social

232. Casey et al., supra note 216, at 63 (discussing cognitive and neurobiological
hypotheses that fail to adequately account for adolescent decision-making behavior).
233. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 162. See generally
Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215.
234. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 97–98. See also, Laurence
Steinberg, Dustin Albert, Marie Banich, Elizabeth Cauffman, & Sandra Graham, Age
Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report:
Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCH 1764, 1764 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg
et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity] (noting that [n]eurobiological evidence in support of
the dual systems model is rapidly accumulating”).
235. See infra notes 236–50, and accompanying text. For slightly different versions of the
dual systems model, see Casey et al., supra note 216; Geier & Luna, supra note 188. See also,
Catherine Sebastian et al., Social Brain Development and the Affective Consequences of Ostracism
in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 134, 138 (2010) (discussing aspects of the dual
systems model).
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information processing and reward seeking/processing.236 The
second neural system is the cognitive control system. Cognitive
control refers to the abilities to voluntarily coordinate and engage in
goal-directed behavior. This system includes the prefrontal cortex,
which is involved in executive function, decision making, and selfregulatory functions, and “association” areas, which connect
different regions of the brain and thus support the complex
integration of function.237
In the socio-emotional system, the neurotransmitter dopamine
modulates the neural reward circuitry.238 (Recall that when
stimulated by a chemical impulse, certain neurons trigger the release
of neurotransmitters that then chemically stimulate the next neuron
in the circuit.)239 The mechanisms underlying dopamine
neurotransmission continue to mature during adolescence.
Dopaminergic activity peaks rapidly and dramatically in early
adolescence, around the time of pubertal maturation.240 Researchers
believe that this peak in activity makes adolescents experience a
potentially rewarding stimuli as even more rewarding than would be
the case during either childhood or adulthood.241 The resulting
heightening of reward salience leads to increased sensation seeking—
a tendency to seek out novel, varied, and highly stimulating
experiences, coupled with a willingness to take risks in order to attain
them.242 Consistent with this theory, studies show that sensation
236. The socio-emotional system includes the amygdala, nucleus accumbens,
orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus. Steinberg, Adolescent
Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 83.
237. Id. at 93–94. The cognitive control system also includes parts of the corpus
callosum, which connects the left and right hemispheres. Id.
238. Geier & Luna, supra note 188, at 216.
239. NELSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 24.
240. Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity, supra note 234, at 1764–66; Geier
& Luna, supra note 188, at 216–17. Although the increase in dopaminergic activity tends to
coincide with puberty, evidence suggests that it occurs independent of puberty. Steinberg,
Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 89–90. Oxytocin, another neurotransmitter that
operates within the socio-emotional network, however, is more directly linked to the rise in
pubertal hormones. Oxytocin’s functions include regulating sensitivity to social stimuli.
Gonadal steroid release at puberty leads to changes in oxytocin receptors. Studies have
confirmed adolescents’ sensitivity to emotional and social stimuli, heightened awareness of
others’ opinions, and feelings of self-consciousness. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra
note 215, at 89–90.
241. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 85.
242. Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity, supra note 234, at 1765;
Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 85.
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seeking, risk preference, susceptibility to deviant or anti-social peer
influence, and reward sensitivity all follow a curvilinear, “∩”-shaped
trend; they begin to increase at age ten, peak around ages fourteen
to fifteen (depending on the study and measure used), then
decline.243
The cognitive control system follows a more gradual and linear
developmental trajectory than does the socio-emotional system.244
Three structural changes in the brain characterize the maturation of
cognitive control during adolescence:
First, the synaptic pruning that began in childhood accelerates in
the prefrontal regions of the brain, with the prefrontal cortex
maturing in mid-adolescence.245 This correlates with the maturation
of basic cognitive processes by age sixteen. Second, myelination,
which improves neural connectivity, continues within the regions of
the cortex and between the different cortical regions through
adolescence and into the twenties.246 This change correlates with
observed behavioral improvements in higher-order and executive
functions (future orientation, planning, response inhibition, spatial
working memory) associated with the integrated functioning of
multiple prefrontal regions.247 And third, myelination also continues
between the cortex and other regions of the brain, including
connections between regions involved in social and emotional
information-processing, and those involved in cognitive control

243. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 163; Sindy R. Sumter
et al., The Developmental Pattern of Resistance to Peer Influence in Adolescence: Will the
Teenager Ever Be Able to Resist?, 32 J. ADOLESCENCE 1009–10 (2009). See also, Steinberg et al.,
Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 89 (ages thirteen to sixteen). See also, Steinberg et
al., Sensation Seeking, supra note 234, at 1774 (ages twelve and fifteen).
244. Steinberg et al., Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 93.
245. Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 189, at 7; Toga et al., supra note 173, at 149–50;
Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation, supra note 180, at 62. There is also some evidence of
synaptic pruning in the association areas (areas throughout the brain connecting its different
regions and supporting the complex integration of inter-regional function). Luna,
Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 238.
246. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 94–96; Geier & Luna, supra
note 188, at 216; Paus, Growth of White Matter, supra note 189, at 26; Luna, Developmental
Changes, supra note 188, at 237–41; Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 189, at 7. Because
myelination involves the gradual enhancement of established connections (as opposed to the
initial establishment of such connections), the changes in white matter represent a refinement
of executive control processes that are in place earlier in development. Luna, Developmental
Changes, supra note 188, at 239–40.
247. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 94–96.
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processes (especially the prefrontal regions).248 The increased
connectivity between these regions correlates with coordination of
affect (the external expression of emotions) and cognition; the result
is that emotional regulation and impulse control both improve
through the mid-twenties.249 Strategic planning, anticipation of
future consequences, and resistance to neutral (as opposed to antisocial) peer influence and peer influence in general all follow the
same trajectory, increasing linearly from preadolescence through late
adolescence and early adulthood.250
In summary, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities are mature by
age sixteen, giving them the capacity to process information and
make rational decisions. But the heightened sensitivity to rewards
that increases and peaks around mid-adolescence inclines them
towards risk taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity; these
inclinations may dominate or overwhelm their cognitive processes
and shape their behaviors, especially in situations triggering
heightened emotion or pressure.251 Their susceptibility to these
confounding influences on their decision making begins to decline
after mid-adolescence, however, while their abilities to exercise
cognitive control increases, ultimately reaching mature levels in their
twenties.252
While adolescence technically ends at age eighteen or nineteen,
former adolescents do not reach adult levels of neurobiological or
behavioral maturity immediately.253 Brain development continues
well into the mid-twenties, both through synaptic pruning, especially
248. Id. at 94–98. Important social and emotional information-processing regions of the
brain include the limbic and paralimbic regions. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. See also, Sumter et al., supra note 243, at 1016 (reporting a steady increase in
reported resistance to general peer influence with age). See generally Luna et al., What has
fMRI Told Us About the Development of Cognitive Control Through Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN &
COGNITION 101, 101 (2010) [hereinafter Luna et al., Development of Cognitive Control].
251. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 97–98; Luna, Developmental
Changes, supra note 188, at 257.
252. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 97–98; Luna, Developmental
Changes, supra note 188, at 257.
253. Some scholars suggest that United States and most Western cultures view
adolescence as extending into the early 1920s. See, e.g., Glen R. Elliott & S. Shirley Feldman,
Capturing the Adolescent Experience, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT
1 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990). Researchers rarely include subjects older
than eighteen in studies involving adolescents, however, see, e.g., Jeffrey Jensen Arnett,
Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 476 (2000) [hereinafter Arnett, Emerging Adulthood].
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in the frontal cortex, and myelination.254 Higher-order executive
function, emotional regulation, and impulse control also improve
through the mid-twenties.255 Emerging adults aged eighteen to
twenty-two demonstrate increased levels of risk taking in the
presence of peers, compared to older adults (though they are less
subject to peer influence than are adolescents—in one study, peer
presence doubled risk-taking among adolescents, increased it by fifty
percent among emerging adults, and had no effect on adults aged
twenty-five and older.).256 The continuation of developmental
processes into the post-adolescent period thus provides
neurobiological and behavioral support for treating early adulthood
as a distinct period of development.257
Professor Jeffrey Arnett, whose study of adolescence was cited by
the Supreme Court in Roper, has also studied the period immediately
following adolescence. Arnett and others now characterize ages
eighteen to twenty-five as a distinct developmental period, which
they call “emerging adulthood.”258 Arnett argues that while a
traditional definition of adolescence followed neatly by adulthood
may be expedient, it fails to capture the complex reality of this period
of life.259 Emerging adults themselves seem to agree and tend to

254. See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 245–50, and accompanying text.
256. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 90–91; Margo Gardner &
Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making
in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 625 (2005).
257. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter
Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain
Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001).
258. Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, supra note 253, at 469. See generally JEFFREY JENSEN
ARNETT, ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A CULTURAL APPROACH (4th ed.
2010); EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey
Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006); JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING
ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES
(2004); READINGS ON ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett
ed., 2002).
259. THOMAS P. GULLOTTA ET AL., THE ADOLESCENT EXPERIENCE 17 (4th ed., 2000).
G. Stanley Hall, who initiated the scientific study of adolescence, began at the beginning of the
twentieth century with the publication of his two-volume work on the psychology of
adolescence; he viewed adolescence as extending from age fourteen to age twenty-four. See also
G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO PHYSIOLOGY,
ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION (1904). Hall likely
chose a range bounded by the average ages of the initial changes of puberty and of entry into
marriage and parenthood. Today researchers view adolescence as starting and ending earlier.
This may be partly because on one end, the onset of puberty occurs earlier than it did in 1900,
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regard themselves as neither adolescents nor adults, but instead in
between the two.260
At the behavioral level, Arnett characterizes emerging adulthood
as a time for identity exploration, free from defined social roles and
expectations. Several of the risky behaviors that emerge during
adolescence peak during this time, including unprotected sex,
substance abuse, and high risk driving behaviors (including driving at
high speeds or while intoxicated).261 Steinberg has argued that
increases in these behaviors do not necessarily reflect an increasing
propensity towards risk taking during late adolescence/emerging
adulthood, but instead the increased opportunities to do so that
come with aging. After high school, for example, approximately onethird of emerging adults attend college and spend the next several
years in a period of semi-autonomy. They assume some of the
responsibilities of independent living but, they also continue to rely
on adults for others.262 Approximately forty percent of all emerging
adults leave their parents’ home but later move back at least for a
period of time over the course of their late teens and twenties.263
The next Part considers possible implications of this research.
3. Conclusions from the science of development
Research in the various disciplines that study cognitive
development has advanced tremendously in the last decade or so.
Some of its insights have already influenced state decision making
affecting the young.264 Others have significant potential for doing so.
Yet state actors considering the implications of development for state
decision making should proceed with care (as they should whenever
they rely on specialized knowledge from fields outside their
expertise). With respect to the science of cognitive development in
and on the other because many more people share a significant social transition—high school
graduation. In 1900, for example, only ten percent of people ages fourteen to seventeen
attended high school; by 1985, that percentage had risen to ninety-five percent. See also,
Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, supra note 253, at 476.
260. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Learning to Stand Alone: The Contemporary American
Transition to Adulthood in Cultural and Historical Context, 41 HUM. DEV. 295 (1998).
261. Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence, supra note 164, at 339.
262. Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, supra 253, at 471. Other emerging adults, though,
leave home not to attend college but instead to live independently and work full-time. Id.
263. Id. (citing F. Goldscheider & C. Goldscheider, Leaving and Returning Home in
20th Century America, 48 POPULATION BULL. 1 (1994)).
264. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
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particular, state actors must remain aware that development is an
organic process. As developmental scientists emphasize, the timing
and pace of normal development varies according to the
individual.265 Age is only an imperfect proxy for development.266
Policy making, on the other hand, often requires definite, clearly
bounded categories. Developmental science may usefully inform but
cannot determine these.267 It is the state actor who must consciously
decide the chronological direction in which potential line-drawing
errors will lie.268
Keeping these cautions in mind, several conclusions have already
emerged from the scientific literature which may have significant
salience for state actors:
First, it appears that education and experience may be as
important in adolescence as they have long been understood to be in
early childhood.269 Given that the synaptic pruning that occurs
during early childhood is experience-dependent, there is reason to
believe that the later-occurring synaptic pruning is likewise

265. See, e.g., Sumter et al., supra note 243, at 1017; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(2010). But see Maroney, supra note 165, at 94 (“[A]dolescent brain science has had, is likely
to have, and should have only moderate impact in the [juvenile justice] courts.”).
266. Id. See also, Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity, supra note 234, at
1776 (cautioning that “[i]t is important to remember . . . that individuals of the same age vary
in their sensation seeking and impulse control and that variations in these characteristics are
related to variations in risky and antisocial behavior.”).
267. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform
Public Policy?, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Nov. 2009, at 739, 747 (concluding that “[a]ny system of
boundary drawing that relies on science for guidance, whether neuroscience or behavioral
science, is bound to be imperfect, but it will nevertheless sit on a stronger foundation than one
that is ignorant about development.”); Maroney, supra note 165, at 145–56 (discussing
inherent constraints of developmental neuroscience’s utility in juvenile justice cases,
emphasizing its inability to inform individual assessments).
268. In other words, state actors must evaluate a given context and decide whether it is
preferable to mistakenly include individuals in the relevant category (e.g., a category that
presumes the competence of twelve-year-olds to drive will include A, a twelve-year-old who
has not yet attained driving competence) or mistakenly exclude them from it (e.g., the
category that presumes the competence of thirteen- but not twelve-year-olds to drive will
exclude B, a twelve-year-old who has attained driving competence).
269. Anne Dailey, for example, has examined the research on the importance of early
caregiving to psychological development and the implications for constitutional law. Anne C.
Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431 (2006). Dailey argues that the centrality of
early caregiving relationships to healthy development supports increased constitutional
protection for caregiving relationships. Id.
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experience-dependent.270 Steinberg observed that, if this synaptic
activity is activity- and experience-dependent, the brain plasticity
characteristic of this period of adolescence would represent “a time
of considerable opportunity for intervention.”271 The importance of
synaptic pruning to development seems to find support in one
longitudinal study, which found that the developmental trajectory of
gray matter in children with higher intelligence quotients
demonstrated higher levels of plasticity, with a “particularly vigorous
phase of cortical thinning.”272 Without rich educational experiences
during adolescence, brain development may stall, with the young
person’s cognitive potential remaining unrealized.
Second, the ability to reason reaches mature levels by midadolescence, around age sixteen. Psychosocial maturity improves
throughout adolescence but does not reach mature levels until the
twenties. The heightened vulnerability to risk taking that peaks in
middle adolescence before declining is normative; to the extent that
it has a neurobiological basis, efforts to reduce risk taking through
education will have limited success. While adolescents have the
cognitive capacities to make rational decisions, real-world contexts
and stressors will continue to confound their capacities and impede
their decision-making. So far, only aging (and, presumably, the
neural development that attends it) reliably and significantly
correlates with decreases in adolescent risk taking. As a result of this
ongoing development, adolescents’ decision-making abilities will be
both age dependent and context specific.
Finally, it appears likely that emerging adults do not reach full
cognitive maturity until their early- to mid-twenties. Indeed, some of
the decision-making deficiencies and other characteristics typically
observed in adolescence persist into this stage of life.
A discussion of the policy implications of this and the previous
two Parts follows.

270. The authors of one study argue that “[r]ich early experience must be followed by
rich and more sophisticated experience later in life, when high-level circuits are maturing in
order for full potential to be achieved.” Fox et al., supra note 173, at 35.
271. Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist, supra note 168 at 161. See also Luna,
Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 268 (suggesting that adolescent experience may
guide synaptic pruning and thus help determine the specialization of neural circuitries that
support task ability and response state, which refers to the ability to orchestrate cognitive
demands).
272. Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 189, at 7.

1118

DO NOT DELETE

1055

12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM

Immature Citizens and the State
V. DEVELOPING CITIZENS

The previous three Parts have explored the interests and rights of
parents and the young, and the state’s minimum ends with respect to
its citizens generally. This Part outlines a set of policies that I argue
best accounts for these interests and rights. Again, at the core of
state actions respecting the immature is citizens’ liberty, which is the
minimum basic end of the liberal constitutional democratic state.
The dual goals of safeguarding immature citizens’ current liberty and
their future liberty ground a framework around which to build a set
of policies that together form a coherent whole. The framework
defines the primary goal, and the policies enable their realization.
They in turn should be informed by and account for the interests of
those most affected by them—parents and young citizens themselves.
To be clear, these are not the only policies that might flow from
the analyses of the previous Parts. Rather, they demonstrate that a
body of policies can be derived from common principles to form a
transparent, effective, and coherent whole.273
Part V.A begins by briefly recapitulating the objectives of the
state, and the interests and rights of parents and the immature. Part
V.B weighs and synthesizes all these, deriving from them four ends
that state policies affecting young citizens should aim to achieve.
Parts V.C and V.D then recommend (and address potential
objections to) numerous policies that advance those ends, from
infancy through emerging adulthood.
273. This approach is consistent with that recently advocated by Emily Buss, at least in
some respects. In What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development
Research, Buss criticizes a law-making approach that, informed by developmental science,
would focus on children’s acquisition of capacities in extending to them specific rights and
responsibilities. Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Buss, Child Development
Research]. Such an approach, Buss argues, underestimates the complexity involved in
determining “capacity;” takes an idealized, caricatured view of adult “maturity” that is at odds
with actual adult functioning; mistakenly assumes that children’s capacities are consistent across
various contexts; and, by treating children’s capacities as ascertainable at any given point in
their development, elides the law’s potential to shape their development in a direction
consistent with society’s goals. Id. It is my goal to avoid these pitfalls. Other arguments raised
by Buss are less salient here, or I leave their consideration to those involved in decision- and
policy-making processes. For example, Buss discusses the inevitable mismatches between
developmental categories (which cannot establish bright lines) and legal categories (which
often must do so). I contend that these are context-specific assessments that must simply be
made at that level. Weighing, for example, the potential harms involved by overestimating
adolescent capacity in a given context against that involved in underestimating that capacity,
can help state actors determine where the risk of error ought to lie.
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A. Parents, the Young, and the State, Redux:
Interests, Rights, and Ends
The state’s most basic end is citizens’ liberty; its secondary end is
its citizenry’s performance of those functions essential to its
continued existence.274 To ensure citizens’ basic liberty during their
immaturity, the state must withhold from others absolute authority
over them. To ensure their basic liberty upon reaching maturity, it
must prevent others from depriving immature citizens of the ability
to develop the basic capacities of citizenship.275
Parents’ interests include the liberty to raise their children as they
deem best, with as little state interference as possible. Parenthood is
a highly valued status, and many parents consider forming families
and childrearing to be part of their self-identities.276 Constitutional
jurisprudence validates their sentiments by recognizing the right to
parent as an aspect of parents’ individual liberties. But that same
jurisprudence restricts the illiberal tendencies of recognizing an
other-determining liberty by providing it relatively weak
protection.277
The needs and abilities of the young change dramatically as they
develop, and their interests change accordingly. The young require
care appropriate to the extent of their dependency. They have a
liberty interest in exercising the rights of which they are capable and
a welfare interest in being protected from their deficiencies. They
should receive the experiences and education necessary for them to
develop the capacities of citizenship, so that they may choose how
and whether to exercise those capacities once they reach maturity.
And they should receive the experiences and education necessary for
them to ultimately choose the courses their lives will take.278
Their legal status as minors in some instances narrows the scope
of their constitutional rights, but it does not altogether deny them
constitutional rights or protections. Some of their liberty and welfare
interests have received constitutional protections. For example,
minors are entitled to independently make decisions within their
competence affecting intimate aspects of their lives. A state that

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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presumes minors’ incapacity in this context and thus seeks to restrict
their decisional autonomy (by requiring, for example, parental
notification or consent before a minor may obtain an abortion) must
also provide affected minors the opportunity to demonstrate their
capacity—i.e., individualized determinations of the minor’s decisionmaking competence.279 Conversely, minors’ interests in being
protected from their deficiencies requires states to presume and
account for demonstrated decision-making deficiencies that render
minors more susceptible to committing criminal offenses, and less
culpable for those actions.280
B. Synthesis: Framework to Guide State Decisions
Affecting the Immature
This Part sets out a four-part framework comprising the ends
that policies affecting the immature should further. It briefly explains
the way in which each end advances or sacrifices the various
objectives summarized above and justifies the proposed balance.
First, the state should afford parents the liberty to form and raise
a family. Doing so furthers parents’ interests in childrearing and the
state’s obligation to ensure citizens’ (here, parents’) liberty. By
encouraging and respecting parental commitment, however, parental
deference also aims to further the state’s obligation to ensure the
welfare of the immature.281 Deference to parents admittedly risks
restricting the current and future liberty of the immature. Some
parents, for example, may exercise greater control during their
children’s immaturity than is justified by their dependency, or may
endeavor to control and thus constrain their children’s future liberty.
The next part of the framework guards against these risks.
Second, then, notwithstanding the presumption of parental
deference, the state must withhold from parents and others absolute
authority over the immature. The state’s minimum obligation to its
young citizens—ensuring their basic liberty—precedes its
commitment to ensuring parents’ specific childrearing liberty and
thus limits the extent of parental noninterference. The state may
279. See supra Part IV.B.
280. See id. For a critique of the analytical and expressive aspects of the Court’s recent
jurisprudence relating to juvenile punishment, see Buss, Child Development Research, supra
note 273, at 42–47.
281. See infra Part V.C.1. Noninterference with parenting choices also respects a
secondary value of the liberal state—pluralism. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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safeguard the basic liberty of immature citizens by exercising its
parens patriae power. At a minimum, it must prevent others from
interfering with the young in a way that conclusively decides the
course of their lives.
Third, the state must ensure that the immature will reach
maturity with their basic entitlement to liberty intact. Basic liberty
entails deciding how one’s life will ultimately go. The state must thus
endeavor to ensure that children will learn of their basic life options,
and will develop the abilities they need to pursue them. Because the
state must accordingly ensure that the young receive certain
educational experiences, achieving this end may interfere with
parents’ liberty and even the basic liberty of the young themselves.
But the state rightly constrains the liberties of both during children’s
immaturity (e.g., by compelling their school attendance) in order to
preserve to the young their later life-deciding liberty.
Fourth, the state must ensure that its citizenry will reach maturity
with the capacities to fulfill the basic obligations of citizens—the
ability to contribute to the state’s functioning through work; the
ability to participate in democratic governance; and the ability to
form families and raise children and future generations of citizens.
This end ensures the perpetuation of the state itself and its continued
ability to preserve citizens’ basic liberty. It simultaneously furthers
mature citizens’ liberty to choose the types of economic and civic
participation in which they will engage. Like the third end of the
framework, this end also requires that the young receive certain
experiences; achieving it thus means that it too may interfere with
both parents’ and children’s liberties during the latter’s immaturity.
Implicit in its third and fourth ends is the notion that, once an
individual attains the mature capacity to exercise a liberty, the state
should endeavor to ensure that the individual in fact receives that
liberty.
The following two Parts (V.C–D) commend policies that aim to
further these four ends.
C. Policies—Infancy and Childhood
The fundamental policy advocated in this Part is that of minimal
state interference with the liberty of parents to raise their infants and
young children as they see fit. Parents should instead receive nearabsolute deference during this period of their children’s
development, though the state should continue to withhold from
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them absolute authority over their children. Parents should thus have
no entitlement to interfere with their children in such a way as to
ultimately decide their lives—such as withholding medical treatment
from a critically ill child.282 In addition, states should increase efforts
to educate parents about the importance of early childhood
experiences, though these efforts should stop short of mandating
participation in any specific programs.
Parental deference in early childhood aims to achieve the first
two of the four ends above—deferring to parents’ childrearing
decisions, yet preserving immature citizens’ basic liberty. The
following two Parts elaborate on these policies and consider
objections likely to be raised to them.
1. Minimizing interference in parenting
The first form of noninterference in parenting is universal, and
nearly invisible: the state permits biological parents to be the default
caregivers for their infant children—an outcome that is intuitive but
not inevitable.283 It secures for the young, at minimal administrative
cost to the state, care provided by those most likely to be committed
to their well-being.284 While the state acts as caregiver of last resort,
it lacks the capacity to be children’s default caregiver. It also lacks the
resources and the capacity to identify an “ideal” caregiver for each
child, if such a person exists.
Strong parental deference should continue into infancy and
childhood. Noninterference allows parents to share the values and
conception of the good life that will permeate their children’s
282. For discussions of spiritual treatment exemptions to child abuse statutes, see Jennifer
L. Hartsell, Mother May I . . . Live?: Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for
Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499 (1999); Jennifer Stanfield,
Comment, Faith Healing and Religious Treatment Exemptions to Child-Endangerment Laws:
Should Parents Be Allowed to Refuse Necessary Medical Treatment for Their Children Based on
Their Religious Beliefs?, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 45 (2000).
283. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the ParentChild Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1069
(2003). Carbone and Cahn argued that biological ties are important, but so are relationships;
thus, “once two parents are established on the basis of biology or acknowledgment at the
child’s birth, their parental status cannot be challenged or changed without consideration of
the child’s interests, which will ordinarily be presumed to lie with the continuation of the
relationship.” Id.
284. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2432–33 (1995) (arguing that biological bonds, affective bonds, and informal social
norms all operate as extralegal influences that reinforce parental commitment).
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formative years.285 And though it may seem counterintuitive, in some
ways noninterference in parenting decisions may be the best way to
advance children’s welfare interests during this time. Emily Buss is
among those scholars who argue that noninterference more generally
may lead to better parenting overall.286 Buss argues first, parents are
“child-specific expert[s]” and are generally better qualified than state
actors to assess and meet their individual children’s needs. Second,
parents who make unimpeded childrearing decisions may find
childrearing more fulfilling; this may increase their enjoyment of and
commitment to the task, which in turn can make them better
parents.287 Finally, even when parents are less competent than is
ideal, state intrusion and oversight create disruptions that might
undermine the struggling parents’ effectiveness further. Thus
noninterference, even in cases of less-than-optimal parenting, can
better serve children’s interests.288
A final justification for adopting a policy of parental deference
during this stage is more frankly pragmatic. Maximizing parental
deference in their children’s early lives may make parents somewhat
more inclined to accept a greater level of interference in adolescence.
During that equally crucial period, the state should universally
require certain educational experiences—in particular, out-of-home
comprehensive secondary education—that many parents who wish to
shield their children from certain experiences will resist.289

285. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the “parental direction of the religious
upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place
in our society.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (discussing implications of
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1924)) (additional citations omitted). This
freedom to live out and instill in their children their values also furthers the value of pluralism.
286. Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 134, at 287–96.; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 91, at 7–8 (“[P]reference for minimum state intervention and for leaving
well enough alone . . . [since] law is incapable of effectively managing, except in a very gross
sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between parent and child.”); Gilles, supra
note 88, at 937.
287. Buss, Child Development Research, supra note 273, at 288–89.
288. Id. at 290–91. Buss acknowledges the general lack of social science research
supporting these contentions, but observes that the difficulty of empirical research renders this
a state of affairs unlikely to change. Id. at 298–99. She thus proposes that the state should
interfere only in cases involving the sorts of “severe and ascertainable harm[s]” to children that
fall within the state’s special competence. Id. at 289. The state’s relative competence, Buss
argues, is greatest where the alleged harm relates to the child’s development as a public citizen
and where there is a “broad consensus” about the harm. Id.
289. See infra Part V.D.1.
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In what ways would maximum parental deference differ from
current policy? First, the state might give parents greater control over
their children’s education, even in the public schools. Currently,
parents who wish to enroll their children in public schools yet
exempt them from certain aspects of the curriculum are
presumptively unable to do so.290 Parental deference could reverse
this presumption. Second, state agencies that enforce child
protection laws might develop protocols, particularly in situations of
potential neglect, that minimize the more obvious and physical
manifestations of interference.
Exceptions to a policy of parental deference would remain, and
the state would retain and exercise authority necessary to preserve
the current and future liberties of the immature. Presumptive
parental deference would not preclude, for example, laws such as
those protecting children from abuse or neglect, or denying parents
the ability to withhold medical treatment from their critically ill
children.
Another exception, of sorts, to a general presumption of
noninterference grows out of the overwhelming evidence
demonstrating the importance of basic educational experiences
beginning in infancy. In light of this evidence, the state should
continue or increase its efforts to ensure that infants and young
children receive early experiences necessary for optimal cognitive
development. Programs such as Head Start and Early Head Start
recognize the importance of this period. Since their creation, its
importance has become all the clearer. The federal government could
expand these efforts and support others. For example, it may provide
funding for states to widely disseminate and promote educational
materials on the importance of early childhood learning (perhaps in
hospitals and birthing centers, targeted to parents who claim child
dependents on state tax forms, etc.).
Despite the importance of early experience to subsequent
development, it is arguably unnecessary for states to require early
education or other mandatory programs. The sorts of experiences
that benefit young children’s development tend to consist of
activities that are well within the abilities of the average parent (e.g.,
engaging the very young in conversation, reading, singing, etc.), that

290. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1058 (6th Cir.
1987).
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are not dependent on specific curricular content, and that are thus
unlikely to be opposed by many parents.291
2. Overcoming objections
The concept of strong parental rights is something of an
embarrassment—or at least an enigma—in the liberal constitutional
democracy. Their dependency alone, the argument goes, does not
justify vesting in others a “right” over the lives of the young. James
Dwyer has critiqued what he calls this “paradox” in the state’s
conception of personal liberty. Dwyer argues that vesting in parents a
“right” over their children is inconsistent with the state’s core legal
and moral principles.292 He points out that constitutional protection
for parents’ decisions “regarding children’s education and
upbringing are actually a form of ‘other-determination.’”293 Parental
rights are thus a singular anomaly in a constitutional jurisprudence
that otherwise limits rights to self-determining individual choices and
activities.294
Others also criticize the use of “rights-talk” with respect to
family life. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse resists the notion of parental
rights due to its tendency to elide the primary concept—parental
responsibility—that provides some justification for parents’ power.295
291. Knudsen et al., supra note 170. One non-profit in a Mississippi community, for
example, works to improve young children’s development and readiness for kindergarten by
targeting their parents. It offers low-income parents weekly sessions aimed at exposing them to
developmentally appropriate ways of enhancing their children’s education. Through a
curriculum grounded in accepted research on early childhood cognitive and linguistic
development, parents learn the significance of activities including: (1) engaging their young
children in active conversations about their immediate environment; (2) involving children in
ordinary activities (like folding laundry) and using those activities as educational vehicles (“the
shirt has three buttons”); and (3) singing and reading to their children. See BabySteps:
Empowering
Parents,
Program
Components,
http://www.takebabysteps.com/
program_components.htm#Auxiliary_Program_Components (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). See
also DIV. OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOC. SCIENCES AND EDUC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL &
NAT’L ACADS., EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING: NEW KNOWLEDGE FOR
POLICY (2001).
292. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare, supra note 89, at 1410.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1373, 1406–11.
295. Woodhouse, supra note 84, at 1818; see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as
Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337 (2002) (arguing that a
constitutional jurisprudence grounded in individual, autonomy-based rights is poorly suited to
resolving questions of family relationships); see also Bartlett, supra note 85, at 298 (identifying
and objecting to the view that parenthood is an entitlement that follows the acceptance of
parental responsibility).
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Mary Ann Glendon has argued more generally that emphasizing
rights fosters self-interest instead of connection and nurturing, and is
thus particularly inapt in the context of families.296
One must concede the validity of these critiques. In particular, a
parent’s deeply felt desire to influence one’s children ought not—
again, especially in the liberal state—create an entitlement to control
one’s children’s lives.
On the other hand, no right is absolute, and as discussed above,
the parental right is a particularly squishy one.297 The fact that
parents’ rights tend to be fundamentally protected in rhetoric only,
moreover, mitigates their potential harm.298 States regularly intrude
on these rights, and so long as their intrusion stops short of
threatening the existence of the parent-child relationship and does
not infringe other constitutionally protected rights, the Supreme
Court all but looks the other way.299 Myriad health, safety, and
educational regulations that constrict parents’ rights are a testament
to this. Viewed in this light, the “parental right” could more
accurately be characterized a “parental presumption.”300
There is a third factor that may assuage some of the concerns
raised above. As it stands, parental rights implicitly recede to some
degree as children’s autonomy grows. This recession is consistent
with both constitutional and liberal arguments for individual rights.
The next Part argues that it should happen in a more systematic and
explicit way.
296. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS-TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 9–15 (1991). See generally Gretchen Ritter, Women’s Civic Inclusion and the Bill of
Rights, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 60, 81–82
(Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman, eds. 2009) (discussing the shortcoming of rightsbased models of equality and arguing “that the republican vision of popular sovereignty
expressed in the Bill [of Rights can support] . . . a more inclusive notion of equality and
citizenship that draws on women’s experiences in their families and communities as well as
their interests as autonomous individuals,” and rejecting a politics “based on a stripped-down
liberal individualism” in favor of one that addresses the “social embeddedness and community
values [that] shape us all.”)
297. See supra Part III.B
298. See id.
299. As discussed above, constitutional doctrine allows states broad authority to exercise
their parens patriae and police powers to enact legislation aimed at furthering societal interests
and securing children’s welfare. See supra Part III.B.
300. Given the importance of language itself to beliefs and attitudes, we might do well to
abandon the language of rights when discussing the parent-child relationship. It is perhaps
preferable to speak of “parental deference,” or as suggested by Dwyer, a “parental privilege.”
Dwyer, supra note 70, at 1410.
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D. Policies—Adolescence and Emerging Adulthood
Perhaps more so than in infancy and childhood, existing policies
affecting adolescents and emerging adults fail this group of citizens.
The continuing extent of parental deference, especially over
adolescents’ education, allows parents who choose to do so to
deprive their children of the experience and knowledge they must
gain if they are to have the eventual capacity to decide their own
lives.
This Part thus suggests a simple yet far-reaching policy that
follows, and complements, that proposed for infancy and
childhood—obligatory out-of-home comprehensive education.
Though such a requirement would have been regarded as
unremarkable in the 1980s, it may be seen as radical today. But as
Part V.D.1 argues, this policy is necessary to reliably ensure that the
immature receive the basic experiences and education necessary to
develop the capacities to determine their own life courses and
participate in the economic, political, and social life of the state. If
successful, these policies achieve the state’s third and fourth ends—
safeguarding immature citizens’ future liberty and ensuring the
citizenry’s ability to perform functions essential to the state’s
preservation. If, after having developed these basic capacities, the
now-mature citizen chooses a life of civic and social disengagement
or voluntarily submits to the authority of others, the state will have
nonetheless increased the likelihood that the citizen’s life course was
the product of choice. Part V.D.2 anticipates and addresses
objections to this proposal.
Next, Part V.D.3 urges that state decision making become more
cognizant of and responsive to the capacities of its developing
citizens. State actors should work to ensure that adolescents have the
liberty to make those self-regarding decisions of which they are
capable. These are age- and context-specific liberties. The science of
development should inform the state’s decisions as to which liberties
may be appropriate, allowing decision-makers to make some general
determinations about the development of various capacities. But
science cannot prescribe policy, and decision makers must also
consider other factors—including the possibility and potential
negative externalities of adolescents’ bad choices.
In general, by mid-adolescence the young should receive
authority to make for themselves those decisions which can be
evaluated in a deliberate and considered manner, made outside the
1128
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presence or influence of peers, and which if mistaken, are nonetheless
unlikely to cause significant negative externalities. By taking this
approach to decision making, the state would better meet its
obligation to ensure the basic liberty of the immature; because in
these contexts, adolescents are in fact mature.
To illustrate, this Part suggests two decision-making contexts
that it argues reliably fall within the competence of adolescents by
ages fifteen or sixteen and meet the criteria outlined above: selfregarding health decisions generally—which many state decisions
already recognize; and voting—which they do not.
Finally, Part V.D.4 cautions that adolescents, emerging adults,
and the public should receive protection from young individuals’
ongoing deficiencies. These policies recognize that there are other
contexts that predictably hinder the decision making of young
people, such as those where they must make quick decisions under
pressure. Where the immature are likely to make poor decisions, and
especially where poor decisions risk serious harm to themselves or
others, the state should constrain their decision-making abilities.
This caution furthers the state’s third end—safeguarding immature
citizens’ future liberty (by increasing the likelihood that they will in
fact be around to enjoy their future liberty)—and also the state’s
broader obligation to safeguard the liberty of all its citizens. It
should thus act to safeguard both the immature—and in some of
these contexts, individuals who have technically reached the age of
majority but continue nonetheless to be immature—and citizenry
generally from their cognitive deficiencies. Again to illustrate, this
Part suggests contexts that arguably meet these criteria: driving,
alcohol consumption, and combat-related aspects of military service.
1. Out-of-home comprehensive secondary education
States should make out-of-home comprehensive secondary
education obligatory and require attendance through ages seventeen
or eighteen.
The state must endeavor to safeguard future citizens’ basic
liberty.301 Liberty at a minimum entails making one’s significant life
choices. Yet individuals who choose a life course without knowing
the alternatives available to them make no choice at all. Rather, they
are channeled into a life course that is consistent with others’,
301. See supra Part II.B.2.
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typically their parents’, values and beliefs. Because their resulting life
paths express others’ wills rather than their own, these future citizens
are denied the basic liberty that is their minimum entitlement.
Meaningful choice also requires a reasonable ability to avail
oneself of various alternatives. Comprehensive education thus
ensures not only that the young are exposed to the different choices
available to them in modern society, but also that they are reasonably
prepared to take advantage of them.
Comprehensive secondary education serves another, libertymaximizing purpose. In addition to revealing and preserving
opportunities, rich secondary education can provide the experiences
necessary to individuals’ achieving their cognitive potential. Research
indicates that experience is an important input in the rapiddevelopment period in which adolescents develop adult-level mental
skills.302 Experience leads to improved cognitive abilities, which
endure throughout individuals’ life and may better position them to
elect various alternatives, such as postsecondary education.
Comprehensive secondary education may thus help individuals
realize their innate potential to pursue and excel in a variety of
pursuits or occupations.
Research suggests that the sensitive periods during which the
brain’s development is most responsive to education and experience
have largely ended by late adolescence and early adulthood. It is thus
possible that delaying experience to late adolescence or adulthood,
after the conclusion of these experience-dependent sensitive periods,
may result in adolescents’ failure to fully develop their cognitive
potential.303 A comprehensive education is thus vital for cognitive
development.
School curricula must be substantively comprehensive to support
development and preserve citizens’ future liberty. But education
relates to the state’s secondary end as well—a citizenry with the
capacity to contribute to the state’s continued functioning. In
general, the education required to ensure a self-sufficient and
productive citizenry overlaps with that required to preserve
individual choice over one’s life. Educating the young for civic and
political participation, however, potentially involves transmitting
values that can make this aspect of education more contentious still.

302. See Arnett, supra note 164 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.C.2–3.
303. See supra Part IV.C.2–3.
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Political theorists vigorously debate the sort of civic education
that young citizens in the liberal democratic state ought to receive.
Amy Gutmann has argued that perpetuating the liberal state requires
a robust “democratic education,” which includes instilling in the
young those values conducive to society’s flourishing. She thus
supports teaching tolerance for opposing views and the skills
necessary for rational deliberation so that immature citizens may
critically evaluate different ways of life.304 Michael McConnell
counters that “the new ideal of the liberal citizen [espoused by
Gutmann] seems to conflict with the ideal believer in religion” and
further maintains that “[w]hen government comes to insist that all
citizens should be neutral, tolerant, and egalitarian, it ceases to be a
liberal government.”305 Bruce Ackerman also resists instilling in the
young a robust vision of liberal values, insisting instead that
education in the liberal state must itself aim for neutrality in order to
ensure citizens’ free choice.306
It is unnecessary here to weigh in on this vexing debate. To
achieve the state’s minimum end, the civic education provided to
students must merely ensure their capacity for civic participation. It
may indeed be that endeavoring to instill in them certain values and
a greater inclination toward civic participation would be a more
successful policy. But the focus here is the minimum required by the
state of its citizenry. The young should thus learn what it is the
liberal democratic state requires of its citizenry generally in order for
its continued functioning, and they should learn those skills
necessary to meet those requirements.307
304. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41–47 (1st prtg., rev. ed., 1999).
305. Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 17–20 (Michael W. McConnell et al., eds.,
2001).
306. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139–411 (1980).
307. This proposal echoes that of William Galston, who argues that children should
receive a basic civic education but would stop short of instilling in them other liberal values
such as respect for diversity or rational evaluation of different ways of life. See, e.g., WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE
247–52 (1991). It is even less extensive, however; than Galston’s “basic civic education,”
which would include “child[ren]’s acquisition of . . . the beliefs and habits that support the
polity.” Id. at 252. The proposal here would educate children about the “beliefs and habits
that support the polity” without insisting upon their acquisition. It is likely, however, that
those parents who would resist the state’s actively instilling these values in their children would
similarly resist their exposure to them at all. See supra Part III.C. (arguing that parents’ access
to and influence over their children can give them the ability to thwart state goals with respect
to their education, etc.).
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The distinction between instilling in the young certain civic
values and exposing them to the civic participation required of the
democratic state’s citizenry is arguably subtle, and it is perhaps that
those who parents would oppose the former would also oppose the
latter. There will be parents who hold certain religious or cultural
beliefs—like the Amish in Yoder—who would resist education geared
toward participation in civic life (the Amish, of course also resisted
education geared toward participation in modern society). The
Supreme Court held in Yoder that when such resistance is grounded
in religious belief, it must be respected.308 This is a mistake, and
Yoder should be reconsidered. The state cannot coerce its young
citizens to embrace modern society or participate in civic life. But to
deny them basic education tends toward foreordaining their futures
and unacceptably narrows their options. If in the end, citizens wish
to remain in Amish or other isolated communities and withdraw
from broader civic life, they may certainly do so. But the choice must
be a real one, and it must be theirs to make.
Other parents, in particular those with conservative or
fundamentalist religious views, may resist other aspects of
comprehensive education. They may argue that exposure to certain
knowledge and values is itself antithetical to their religious or
cultural beliefs. Be that as it may, they ought not be permitted to
prevent their adolescent children from receiving a comprehensive
education. Despite this constraint on their authority, parents’
interests in this aspect of childrearing are nonetheless adequately
protected, for the following two reasons:
First, as proposed in the previous Part, the state can entitle
parents to near-absolute control over their infants and younger
children.309 Parents may thus immerse their children in their value
systems and religious beliefs during the early formative period in
children’s lives. And nothing, of course, would prevent parents from
continuing to educate and transmit their values to their children at
home and through extracurricular programs.

308. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
309. See supra Part V.C.1. While it may be ideal, from a child development perspective,
to ensure that all young children receive optimal educational experiences, the state may
reasonably choose to protect children’s welfare and advance its ultimate ends by allowing
parents to determine children’s first experiences, with the benefit of information on the
importance of early education. Id.
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Second, their high-school-aged children have attained cognitive
abilities substantially the same as those of their parents to
comprehend at an abstract level the dissonances between their home
education and values and their “public” education.310 The
significance of this can be illustrated by the well-known litigation of
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, in which
fundamentalist Christian parents challenged a public school’s refusal
to excuse their children from a reading program that presented
values and beliefs that differed from their own.311 Among the
parents’ objections to the reading series were that reading the texts
would confuse their children, stunt the development of their reading
skills by presenting them with views with which they disagreed, and
unleash their imaginations when they ought to be bounded.312 The
parents themselves, however, could read the books without suffering
these harms—as Nomi Stolzenberg observed, the “parents’ faith was
taken to be unshakable; only the children were thought to be at
risk.”313 The Sixth Circuit rejected the parents’ objections and held
that “mere exposure” to ideas did not violate the children’s, or their
parents’, free exercise of religion.314
The schoolchildren in Mozert were in the first through eighth
grades. Under the policies suggested here, the state would have
presumptively deferred to the parents’ desire to enroll their children
in public school yet exempt them from exposure to the objectionable
readers.315 But if parents of high-school-aged children raised the

310. See supra Part IV.C.2.
311. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
312. Id. See also, Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”:
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581,
599 (1993) (summarizing the claims made by plaintiffs in Mozert).
313. Id.
314. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065.
315. Currently, parents who elect to enroll their children in public schools may exercise
only limited control over the education provided their children in that setting. See, e.g., Baker
v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975), aff’g 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (regarding method
of disciplining student); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1–L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th
Cir. 1998) (regarding ability of homeschooled student to attend public school part-time);
Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 813
(1996) (regarding mandatory community service for student); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer
Prod., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996) (regarding mandatory
sex education presentation); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.
1994) (regarding content of assigned reading); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (same); Eric A. DeGroff,
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same objection, the presumption would be reversed. This is because
developmental research indicates that older children are no more
likely than their parents to be confused or stunted by exposure to
teachings that contradict lessons learned at home, whereas such
exposure might very well confuse a younger child.316
Finally, the state should insist that adolescents’ secondary
education should occur in schools outside the home, also for two
reasons: First, it is doubtful that parents who themselves reject
exposure to certain knowledge will effectively transmit that very
information to their children. Second, homeschooling makes it
possible to deny children exposure to different ideas and unlike
peers, which researchers have found to be a key contributor to
adolescent identity development, ability to grapple with different
perspectives, and capacity to develop autonomous choice.317
As of the early 1980s, homeschooling was prohibited in most
states. It is now legal in all of them.318 Most parents who choose to
homeschool their children do so for religious reasons.319 These
parents generally seek to instill in their children certain religious and
social values, and to shield them from incompatible secular values.320
Parents homeschool more than one million children, and the
number of children homeschooled has been growing at a rate of ten
to twenty percent per year.321 Despite the increasing number of
children educated at home, homeschooling regulation has become

Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozert After 20 Years, 38 J.L. &
EDUC. 83, 104–05 (2009).
316. See supra Part IV.C.2–3.
317. Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between
Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2000).
318. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Restraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2008).
319. Id. at 127.
320. Id. Many conservative Christian parents who homeschool their children reject what
they view to be relativistic moral standards, disapproving, for example, both homosexuality and
premarital sex. Id.
321. See PATRICIA M. LINES, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., HOMESCHOOLERS: ESTIMATING
NUMBERS AND GROWTH 1 (web ed. 1999), http://www.ed.gov/offices/OERI/SAI/
homeschool/homeschoolers.pdf. Lines explains that the number of homeschooled children
may be much higher, but that it is difficult to estimate accurately. Many states do not require
parents to register their intention to homeschool, and many parents in states that do impose
such requirements nonetheless fail to comply with them. Id. at 2–3; see also Patricia M. Lines,
Homeschooling Comes of Age, 140 PUB. INT. 74 (2000).
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increasingly lax, and half of all states require no standardized
evaluation of homeschooled children.322
The right to homeschool, and to a lesser degree to enroll their
children in all manner of private schools, grants parents considerable
power to shape the outcome of their children’s lives. By permitting
parents such categorical control over the entire course of their
children’s primary and secondary educations, however, the state
abdicates its fundamental obligation to safeguard their liberty, both
as current and future citizens. The state also fails to advance its end
of ensuring that the young will have attained the capacities required
to meet the obligations of mature citizens.
Allowing parents who would prefer homeschooling the option of
enrolling their children in religious or other private schools might
constitute an acceptable compromise, because the state is better able
to ensure the adequacy of curricular content than when children are
educated at home.323 Some religious schools may resist adopting
aspects of a comprehensive educational curricula; but public
oversight could minimize and address this sort of resistance.
Religious schools may share other shortcomings of homeschooling.
While they expose children to peers, they are likely to attract a more
homogenous community that shares religious beliefs and social
values; thus, children in religious schools may lose out on the
developmental benefits of exposure to unlike peers.

322. Just twenty-five states require standardized evaluation of homeschooled children,
and ten states do not even require that parents who homeschool their children register their
intentions. Yuracko, supra note 254, at 129. Mississippi, for example, has essentially
deregulated homeschooling altogether. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(9) (2009). Other
states impose more specific regulatory schemes, including: requiring school board approval of
home education programs; imposing teaching qualifications; requiring standardized testing;
and establishing oversight by certified teachers. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, §
5001-A(3)(A); N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. §§ 15.1-23-03 to -09 (2009).
323. States have the power to regulate private schools. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 178 (1976). See also supra Part III.B.3. They should oversee the quality of the education
through constitutionally permissible oversight. Courts have held to be within constitutional
limits state regulations requiring standardized testing and requiring that teachers in private, as
well as public schools, receive state certification. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039
(8th Cir. 1988) (requiring all children to take standardized tests); Fellowship Baptist Church v.
Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 495 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring private school students to be taught by
certified teachers).
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2. Autonomy rights
Upon reaching eighteen, individuals acquire virtually all of the
legal rights of citizenship—the right to make medical decisions, enter
into binding contracts, vote, etc.324 But despite the existence of this
categorical age of majority, there are numerous contexts where law
and policy recognize the decisional capacities of those who are still
minors.325 Given the importance of individual liberty, this Part simply
urges state decision makers to consider recognizing their capacities in
other, appropriate contexts.
In general, the young should receive those liberties that they
have the capacity to exercise competently.326 Put another way, in
those contexts where they have achieved decision-making
competence, they should correspondingly have decisional
autonomy.327 The reason for this should be obvious: where one has
gained the capacity to make a decision affecting one’s life, the
justification for allocating to another the entitlement to make that
decision disappears. Cognitive scientists have emphasized the
importance of identifying the contexts where the young have—and
have not—achieved such competence.328 As one behavioral decision
researcher has noted:
324. See, e.g., Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 164, at 559
(cataloguing rights attained upon reaching age of majority).
325. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the
Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 80 (2003) (“[C]hildhood
ends at different ages in different contexts.”). In tort law, for example, adolescents may be held
liable under negligence and intentional tort theories. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 134 (5th ed. 1984); see also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (Kan. 1968) (holding minor tortfeasors liable for damages caused by
negligence); Redd v. Bohannon, 166 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (stating that
minority is not a defense to tort liability for negligence); Queens Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132
N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (finding that minors as young as seven years old may be liable
for both negligence and intentional torts). Courts apply a subjective variable standard of care
rather than the objective reasonable person standard.
326. See supra Part IV.C.2–3.
327. Assessing decisions is itself a complicated business. Behavioral decision researchers
note that assessing decision-making competence involves normative analysis—namely, first
identifying the choice that a rational actor would make in light of individual values and goals.
These values, of course, differ among individuals and can lead them to reach different
decisions. Thus, while an adult might disapprove of an adolescent’s decision, that decision
might be rational in is the sense of being consistent with the adolescent’s values or goals.
Researchers thus also assess individuals’ values—whether individuals’ values correspond to
externally prescribed values, and whether they are internally consistent across choices. See
Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 28 DEV. REV. 12 (2008).
328. E.g., Fischhoff, supra note 327.
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High stakes ride on society’s ability to assess adolescents’ decisionmaking competence. If that competence is overestimated, then
teens will face choices that are too difficult for them. If it is
underestimated, then they will be kept from exercising warranted
independence. If teens believe that the boundaries of their
autonomy have been drawn wrongly, then they may feel unfairly
restricted or unfairly left to fend for themselves.329

In light of both individual and situational, or context-specific,
variability, researchers who study decision making cannot identify
with precision every context where developmentally-normal citizens
have decision-making competence.330 But researchers have made two
critical findings: first, by mid-adolescence, individuals have the
cognitive capacity to make competent decisions; and second, certain
situations and factors reliably hinder the decision-making abilities
that adolescents otherwise possess.331
As a general rule, then, law should presume adolescent decisionmaking competence,332 with certain important qualifications: First,
the presumption should not apply to contexts where their
performance is likely to be compromised. Second, the presumption
should apply most strongly to those contexts where the adolescent’s
decision intimately affects the adolescent only, and least strongly
where the risk is high of negative externalities stemming from a bad
decision.
Two examples of contexts where adolescents should receive
decision-making autonomy follow.
a. Health care decisions. In general, research suggests that
adolescents capably make decisions in those contexts where they can
engage in considered deliberation and where peer pressure is less
likely to play a defining role. Medical decision making, according to
some developmental psychologists, falls within this category, where
“health care practitioners can provide information and encourage

329. Id. at 12.
330. Id. at 13.
331. See supra Part IV.C.
332. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1269 (2000) (arguing in favor of a “legal framework predicated on
adolescent decisional ability” as consistent with contemporary social norms and as a remedy to
current inconsistencies in treatment of adolescents).
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adolescents to think through their decisions before acting.”333
Empirical studies support this conclusion.
Studies of adolescent medical decision making have found that,
by age fourteen, adolescents generally wish to participate actively in
and make decisions affecting their health care.334 They have the
ability to understand their options and evaluate the services offered
them, and they exhibit mature decision making with respect to
these.335 In other studies, researchers have concluded that
adolescents age fifteen or sixteen and above do not significantly
differ from adults in their competence to consent to medical
treatment.336
While adolescent decision making tends to suffer in stressful or
unfamiliar situations, studies have found that adolescents capably
make decisions affecting their health care even under less-than-ideal
conditions. Researchers analyzed the decision-making processes of
adolescent girls confronted with unintentional pregnancies, for
example, and found that those aged “fourteen to seventeen appear to
be similar to legal adults in both cognitive competence and
volition . . . [and] remain competent decision makers when facing an
emotionally challenging real world decision.”337
Many existing policies already reflect this area of adolescent
competence and appropriately balance their interests in making
decisions affecting their lives against the continuing importance of
parental involvement. While default rules governing the right to
consent to or refuse medical treatment usually presume the
decisional incapacity of minors, many create exceptions for “mature

333. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 167, at 592.
334. Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents’ Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their
Decisions to Seek Health Care, 273 J.A.M.A. 1913, 1918 (1995); Bruce Ambuel & Julian
Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent
to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell,
The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD
DEV. 1589, 1595–96 (1982).
335. Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129
(1992); Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents’ Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their Decisions
to Seek Health Care, 273 JAMA 1913, 1918 (1995); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell,
The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD
DEV. 1589, 1595–96 (1982).
336. Weithorn & Campbell, infra note 334, at 1595.
337. Ambuel & Rappaport, infra note 334, at 148. See also Ehrlich, supra note 325, at
93 (2003) (summarizing studies).
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minors.”338 These statutory provisions permit minors found to be
mature to decide the course of their health care treatment (although
some give mature minors only the right to consent to, but not
refuse, treatment).339
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court has held that states
may not impose parental consent requirements on adolescents
seeking abortions, unless those requirements contain bypass
procedures in which an adolescent may instead opt to have a judge
assess her decision-making maturity in an individualized hearing.340
Minors deemed sufficiently mature may thus consent to abortion
procedures without first notifying their parents.341 Numerous states,
moreover, have gone further, declaring that adolescents have an
absolute right to consent to abortion procedures.342
Medical decisions intimately concern adolescents’ lives. To the
extent that negative externalities result from their choices (as in the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases), these are more likely to
occur when adolescents are denied decisional autonomy.343 Policies
that explicitly permit adolescents to obtain medical treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases without parental notification or consent
not only recognize adolescents’ decision-making competence in this
sphere but also arguably prevent negative externalities by making it
more likely that adolescents will seek treatment.
Given evidence that by mid-adolescence they have the capacity to
make mature decisions about their health care,344 applying the
doctrine of presumed incapacity to these teens denies them
decisional autonomy with insufficient justification.

338. See Hartman, supra note 332, at 1308–10.
339. See id. at 1311.
340. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899
(1992). See also, e.g., Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding as
constitutional parental notification statute providing for judicial bypass for mature minors or
minors whose best interests would not be served by notification). See also, supra Part IV.B
(discussing the constitutional rights of minors).
341. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899.
342. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 818–19, 831 (Cal.
1997); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193–96 (Fla. 1989).
343. Joshua A. Douglas, When Is a “Minor” Also an “Adult”?: An Adolescent’s Liberty
Interest in Accessing Contraceptives from Public School Distribution Programs, 43 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 545 (2007).
344. See supra notes 335–37, and accompanying text; supra Part IV.2.3.

1139

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM

2010

b. Voting. Voting also involves the sort of considered decision
making that is within the competence of individuals by midadolescence. Elections unfold over a period of time, giving voters the
opportunity to deliberate and evaluate options without undue
pressure. Voting itself is done anonymously and in private, which
diminishes concern that adolescents’ choices will be unduly
influenced by peers. And since voters self-select, taking the time and
initiative to register, travel to a polling place, etc., it is likely that
those adolescents who would exercise the right would not do so
frivolously.
Voting, moreover, is a core right of citizenship and the means by
which citizens in a democracy limit the power of the state, guarantee
it remains responsive to their interests, and thus ensure their
continued liberty.345 It is the quintessential civic activity, one that the
state should encourage. Given its importance, the state should
withhold the franchise from citizens only when there is a compelling
justification to do so. If a group of citizens has the capacity to
exercise this right of citizenship, the state violates principles of
equality by denying it to them. Extending the franchise to some of
those younger than eighteen (perhaps mid-adolescents aged sixteen
and above) also gives greater voice to a historically underrepresented
category of citizens.
Many people supported the passage of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment on the grounds that eighteen-year-olds were subject to
being drafted into military service and were also held accountable as
adults for criminal behavior.346 Since they thus shouldered the
responsibilities of citizenship, many believed that eighteen-year-olds
should also receive its rights.347 One might thus anticipate the
converse argument—that those under eighteen do not shoulder the
345. Although the constitution only provides explicit protection for voting for
Congressional representatives, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits the disenfranchisement
of those eighteen or older. U.S. CONST. Amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”). For discussions of the historical
context surrounding the Amendment’s passage, see Larry Cunningham, A Question of
Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under
Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 294–97 (2006); Scott, Legal Construction of
Adolescence, supra note 164, at 562–64.
346. WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF
VOTING AGE IN AMERICA 22–34.
347. See Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 164, at 563; Cunningham,
supra note 345, at 295–96.
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obligations of citizenship so are not entitled to the right to vote.
This argument would not withstand scrutiny, however. The right to
vote is not dependent on one’s meeting other obligations of
citizenship; instead, it is itself deemed a fundamental obligation, as
well as a right, of citizenship.
Thus while the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits states from
denying those eighteen and over the right to vote, nothing—other
than lack of political will on the part of older voters—prevents states
from extending the vote to a broader group of its younger citizens.
They should begin giving serious consideration to doing so.
3. Cognitive deficiencies
In order to safeguard their future liberty, as well as the liberties
of the citizenry generally, policies should also take account of the
decision-making deficiencies that characterize adolescence and
emerging adulthood. States should endeavor to identify contexts
where their decision making is predictably poor. Among these are
situations “characterized by high levels of emotional arousal or social
coercion, or that do not encourage or permit . . . consultation.”348
With growing evidence the neurobiological bases of risk-taking and
other behavioral characteristics, efforts to improve adolescents’
decision making or reduce their risk taking through education will
have limited success. Instead, some researchers have simply
concluded that “until adolescents are able to make better decisions,
it is important to modify the environments in which they
develop.”349 In other words, the most (or only) effective approach to
reducing adolescents’ poor decision making in some contexts is to
withhold from them altogether decision-making opportunities. This
means constraining adolescents’ freedoms or extending them
protections in those real-world contexts where other factors tend to
confound good decision making.
One domain in which the state protects adolescents from
potential consequences of their behavior is the juvenile justice
system. Developmental scientists and legal scholars have studied
juvenile crime extensively, including the sorts of decision-making
deficiencies that tend to make adolescents more susceptible to (and

348. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 167, at 592.
349. Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 34.
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less culpable for) criminal activity.350 The distinct procedures and
rehabilitative goals—whether or not these are successfully realized—
of the juvenile court system reflect this understanding. (And given
the extent to which these have received consideration by judges and
legislators alike in the criminal context, they will not be the subjects
of additional focus here.)
State actors should endeavor to gain understanding, and apply
that understanding, in broader contexts. Three examples of these
follow.
a. Driving. Adolescents’ and emerging adults’ liberties may
properly be constrained in those domains where their decisionmaking abilities remains poor—especially where poor decisions have
negative externalities, such as potentially causing harm or death to
the young person or others, or imposing other significant costs.
Incompetent or irresponsible driving, for example, poses grave risks.
And adolescents and emerging adults are notoriously bad drivers.351
Traffic fatalities are the leading cause of death among
adolescents, accounting for more than one in three of their deaths.352
Teen drivers aged sixteen to nineteen are four times more likely than
older drivers to crash, with a crash risk higher than that of any other
age group.353 And though individuals aged fifteen to twenty-four are
only fourteen percent of the population in the United States, they
account for thirty percent of the total cost of motor vehicle injuries
among males and slightly less—twenty-eight percent—among
females.354
All of this is unsurprising, given what is now known about the
neurobiological aspects of their development and how these likely

350. See, e.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 173.
351. See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TEEN DRIVERS:
FACT SHEET (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers
_factsheet.html.
352. NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, WEB-BASED INJURY STATISTICS QUERY AND
REPORTING
SYSTEM
(WISQARS)
(2008)
[hereinafter
WISQARS],
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars.
353. INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, FATALITY FACTS: TEENAGERS 2005
(2006), available at http://www.iihs.org/research/fatality_facts_2005/teenagers.html.
354. ERIC A. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., INCIDENCE AND ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INJURIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 139 (2006). The costs of motor vehicle injuries among adolescent boys
was $19 billion, whereas the total costs of injuries among girls was $7 billion. Id.

1142

DO NOT DELETE

1055

12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM

Immature Citizens and the State

influence commonly-observed behavioral characteristics.355 Though
they may have the capacity to learn driving skills and comprehend
traffic regulations, actual driving situations often demand nearinstant risk-assessment and quick decisions—the sorts of decisionmaking contexts that predictably compromise the quality of
adolescents’ decisions.356 Studies show, for instance, that adolescent
drivers often underestimate or do not immediately recognize
hazardous situations.357 Peer influence is also a factor—the crash risk
for unsupervised drivers increases with the presence of teen
passengers, with the risk increasing with the number of passengers.358
Teen driving has thus become a significant public concern, and
beginning in the mid-1990s many states began taking measures to
ameliorate the problem.359 One measure that has demonstrated some
promise is the graduated driver licensing (“GDL”) system. States
that adopt GDL systems initially extend to new drivers very restricted
licenses, permitting them to gain driving experience under lower-risk
conditions.360 GDL systems thus aim to strike a balance between
355. See supra Part IV.C.2.
356. See id.
357. B.A. Jonah & N.E. Dawson, Youth and Risk: Age Differences in Risky Driving, Risk
Perception, and Risk Utility, 3 ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND DRIVING 13 (1987).
358. Li-Hui Chen et al., Carrying Passengers as a Risk Factor for Crashes Fatal to 16- and
17-Year-Old Drivers, 12 JAMA 1578 (2000). See also, Allan F. Williams & Ruth A. Shults,
Graduated Driver Licensing Research, 2007-Present: A Review and Commentary, 41 J. SAFETY
RES. 77, 82–83 (2010) (reporting that of all fatal crashes involving sixteen- or seventeen-yearold drivers in 2008, forty-one percent involved teenaged passengers with no adult in the
vehicle). See generally Kathryn C. Monahan et al., Affiliation with Antisocial Peers,
Susceptibility to Peer Influence, and Antisocial Behavior During the Transition to Adulthood, 45
DEV. PSYCHOL. 1520, 1520 (2009) (noting that “peer pressure has been hypothesized to be
an important contributor to all sorts of deviant and risky behavior in adolescence, including . . .
reckless driving.”).
359. Williams & Shults, supra note 358 at 77.
360. Id. at 83. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.180B (2009); D.C. CODE § 501401.01 (2009). States have imposed various measures, such as curfews, similarly aimed at
reducing the novice driver’s crash risk. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12814.6 (2009); MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-113 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60-4, 120.01 (2009); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:416.1 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-11 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §
56-1-175 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-12 (2009). See generally INSURANCE
INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, U.S. LICENSING SYSTEMS FOR YOUNG DRIVERS (2009),
available at http://www.iihs.org/laws/GraduatedLicenseIntro.aspx [hereinafter U.S.
LICENSING SYSTEMS] (summarizing state graduated driver licensing law); ADVOCATES FOR
HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY, 2005 ROADMAP TO STATE HIGHWAY SAFETY LAWS 24 (2005);
Carol L. Jones, Comment, The Unintended Consumer: Protecting Teen Drivers Through
Graduated Licensing Laws, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 163 (2003) (discussing graduated
driver licensing systems).
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respecting the capacities of young people, but also protecting them
(and society) from their deficiencies. Under the typical GDL system,
drivers first obtain learners’ permits, which allow them to drive only
under supervision.361 These permits are followed by provisional
licenses, which permit unsupervised driving but impose other
restrictions, such as limits on nighttime driving and prohibitions
against driving with teenaged passengers in the absence of an
accompanying adult.362 These restrictions are then lifted as drivers
gain experience, and when they mature, drivers obtain full
licensure.363 Restrictions such as those imposed by GDL systems seek
to strike a balance between respecting the capacities of young people,
and also protecting them (and society) from their deficiencies.
GDL systems significantly reduce fatality rates, at least of novice
drivers subject to supervised driving and other restrictions. One
study of forty-three U.S. states found that, in those with the most
comprehensive GDL systems, fatal crash rates for sixteen-year-olds
were thirty-eight percent lower than in other states.364 Another study
of U.S. and Canadian GDL systems found a nineteen percent
reduction in the fatality risk of sixteen-year-old novice drivers.365
Little evidence to date supports longer-term benefits of GDL
systems, however; and the evidence gathered so far provides little to
no support for such benefits. Instead, a number of studies have
found no crash reduction effect for eighteen-year-olds366 after the
implementation of GDL programs.367 In California, for example,
sixteen-year-old fatalities decreased significantly under the state’s
GDL
system,
but
eighteen-year-old
fatalities
increased
368
significantly. Critics of GDL thus argue that the systems reduce
361. RUTH A. SHULTS ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND
CONTROL, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, GRADUATED DRIVER
LICENSING (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/duip/spotlite/GradDrvLic.htm.
362. Allan F. Williams & Ruth A. Shults, Graduated Driver Licensing Research, 2007–
Present: A Review and Commentary, 41 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 79–80 (2010).
363. U.S. LICENSING SYSTEMS, supra note 360.
364. See WISQARS, supra note 352.
365. Ward Vanlaar et al., An Evaluation of Graduated Driver Licensing Programs in
North America Using a Meta-Analytic Approach, 41 ACCIDENT ANAL. & PREVENTION 1104,
1107–09 (2009) (reporting study).
366. At eighteen, young drivers become automatically entitled to full licensure/exempted
from GDL requirements in all U.S. states except New Jersey and Maryland, which extend
GDL requirements beyond eighteen. Williams & Shults, supra note 362, at 79.
367. Id. (reporting studies); Vanlaar et al., supra note 365, at 1107–08.
368. Williams & Shults, supra note 362, at 78–79.
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crashes by limiting, not improving, teen driving. Researchers have
only begun to study the effects of GDL programs, however. It thus
remains possible that yet-to-be-completed empirical studies will
contradict or qualify the findings of this first wave of studies. Even if
they do not, it also remains possible that the systems could be
improved so as to improve the likelihood of their having long-term
positive effects.
Ideally, of course, licensing systems would have both short- and
long-term effects, reducing crash rates both among novice drivers
with provisional, restricted licenses, as well as among older
adolescent and young adult fully-licensed drivers whose driving skills
will reflect the enduring benefits of their having participated in and
graduated from a GDL system. If one considers the limited success
that other education-focused programs have had on reducing
adolescent risk-taking, however,369 there is little cause for optimism
in the adolescent-driver context.
To the extent that their poor driving skills are the result of
normative developmental characteristics of adolescent decision
making, it may be the case that the only effective means of reducing
the crashes and fatalities linked to adolescent driving is to restrict, or
in some cases, prohibit their driving altogether. Restrictions could
vary depending on the age and experience of the driver and (like
some existing restrictions) might include limiting the hours during
which adolescents may drive, limiting or prohibiting other
adolescent passengers, prohibiting their driving on highways where
excessive speeding may be easier (and have more serious and fatal
results), or raising the driving age altogether. It is unlikely that a
single model would serve all states equally well, since region-specific
factors should certainly be accounted for.
b. Alcohol consumption. Adolescents and emerging adults are
more likely than those in other age groups to abuse alcohol, and to
be involved in fatal alcohol-related car crashes. A recent National
Institutes of Health report found that “[y]oung drivers ages twentyone to twenty-four continued to have the highest proportion
(39.1%) of alcohol involvement among drivers [in alcohol-related
fatal traffic crashes] in all age groups.”370 Raising the drinking age to
369. See supra Part IV.C.2–3.
370. HSIAO-YE YI ET. AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, TRENDS IN ALCOHOL-RELATED FATAL TRAFFIC CRASHES, UNITED STATES,
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twenty-one, a condition for state receipt of federal highway funds,
acknowledges the additional danger that further impairment of
judgment by alcohol creates for young drivers.371 Indeed, trafficrelated driving fatalities declined when states raised their legal
drinking ages from eighteen to twenty-one.372
Given the widespread cultural acceptance of alcohol use among
adolescents and young adults, however, it is unlikely that raising the
legal age for its consumption further would be feasible. States must
consider other approaches to minimizing the most harmful effects of
adolescent alcohol use.
Young drivers most dangerous in terms of alcohol involvement
are those aged twenty-one to twenty-four. It is possible that for
those aged twenty-four and younger, states should prohibit the
consumption of alcohol before driving altogether; a young driver
with any blood alcohol content would be subject to criminal
sanction. Doing so might help counteract the danger that these
emerging adults pose to themselves and others. States should also
consider greater penalties for driving while intoxicated. As with the
drinking age, the federal spending power would be an appropriate
tool for implementing measures such as these.
c. Combat. In all branches of the armed services, seventeen-yearolds may enlist, with parental consent. Those eighteen and older may
enlist at will.373 Given their continued deficiencies in decisionmaking, still-maturing abilities to assess risk, and inordinate risktaking, we may want to reconsider aspects of military service—in
particular, whether these adolescents and emerging adults have the
capacity to make good decisions in combat situations. It may be that
the duties imposed on this group of emerging adults are premature.
Combat—especially the urban warfare that often characterizes
modern combat—requires soldiers to make split-second decisions
under great pressure. These are arguably the sorts of decisions that
1982–2004 (2006), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance76/
fars04.htm.
371. Federal law conditions currently states’ receipt of federal highway funds on their
imposing a drinking age of twenty-one. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). The statute was upheld
as a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
372. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 163.
373. See Entrance Requirements FAQ, TODAY’S MILITARY, http://todaysmilitary.com
/faq/entrance-requirements (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
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lie outside their competence. Research suggests, moreover, that
younger soldiers respond differently than do adults to stress and may
have increased vulnerability to psychopathology.374
Although it may not be necessary for the state to exclude young
soldiers from military service altogether, it may be prudent to
consider not placing them in these sorts of combat situations until
they have reached full maturity. More research (or the publication of
such research) would help decision makers in this context.
VI. CONCLUSION
Apart from chronological age, the essential characteristic shared
by the young is neither dependence nor incapacity, but instead
change—more specifically, the developmental processes through
which the young develop from immaturity toward maturity. The
changes wrought by these developmental processes can implicate
fundamental liberty interests of the young even during their
immaturity, and the experiences of the young as they develop will
significantly influence the future citizens they will become.
Accounting for these changes is the essential challenge faced by the
state with respect to its immature citizens.
The approach proposed here is grounded in core principles of
the liberal democratic state, but it aims to be useful in practice. It
seeks to provide guidance to decision makers and a measure against
which they and others might assess the effectiveness of their
decisions. Adopting it could result in more coherent decision making
that achieves the ends of the state and better furthers the interests of
all of its citizens, immature and otherwise.

374. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 161.
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